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Abstract 
The  world  is  replete  with  spatial  frictions.  Shipping  goods  across  cities  entails  trade  frictions. 
Commuting within cities causes urban frictions. How important are these frictions in shaping the 
spatial  economy?  We  develop  and  quantify  a  novel  framework  to  address  this  question  at  three 
different levels: Do spatial frictions matter for the city-size distribution? Do they affect individual city 
sizes? Do they contribute to the productivity advantage of large cities and the nature of competition in 
cities? The short answers are: no, yes, and it depends. 
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The world is replete with spatial frictions. Trade frictions for shipping goods across cities induce
consumers and ﬁrms to spatially concentrate to take advantage of large local markets. Yet, such
a concentration generates urban frictions within cities – people spend a lot of time on commuting
and pay high land rents. Economists have studied this fundamental trade-oﬀ for decades, analyzing
how ﬁrms and workers choose their locations depending on the magnitudes of – and changes in –
spatial frictions (Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Still, little is known to date about
how important urban and trade frictions are in shaping the spatial economy. How would the US
economic geography look like if there were no spatial frictions? More speciﬁcally, we focus on the
following three questions: Do spatial frictions matter for the city-size distribution? Do they aﬀect
individual city sizes? Do they contribute to the productivity advantage of large cities and the nature
of competition in cities?
To address these questions, we develop a novel multi-city general equilibrium model with urban
and trade frictions, where city sizes, productivity, and competition are all endogenous. Using data
for 356 US metropolitan statistical areas (msas) in 2007, we structurally estimate the model and
conduct two counterfactual experiments taking into account all market and spatial equilibrium
conditions. We ﬁrst explore what would happen in a hypothetical world where commuting within
cities is costless. We then analyze the other counterfactual scenario where consumers face the
same trade costs for local and non-local products. By comparing the actual and the counterfactual
equilibria in both cases, we can assess the importance of urban and trade frictions for the city-size
distribution, individual city sizes, as well as productivity and competition.
How important are spatial frictions in shaping the spatial economy? First, we ﬁnd that neither
type of frictions signiﬁcantly aﬀects the US city-size distribution. Even in a world without urban or
trade frictions, that distribution would follow the rank-size rule – also known as Zipf’s law – fairly
well. Second, we ﬁnd that eliminating spatial frictions would change individual city sizes within
the stable distribution. Without urban frictions, large congested cities like New York or cities
close by (e.g., New Haven-Milford, CT) would gain population, while small isolated cities (e.g.,
Casper, WY) would lose population. In contrast, without trade frictions, large cities would shrink
compared to small cities as local market access no longer matters. In total, about 4 million people
would move in the former and around 10 million people would move in the latter case. Last, turning
to productivity and competition, eliminating trade frictions would lead to aggregate productivity
gains of 68% and markup reductions of 40%, both of which are unevenly distributed across msas.
Eliminating urban frictions would generate smaller productivity gains of less than 1%, but still lead
to a notable markup reduction of about 10%. In a nutshell, spatial frictions do not matter for the
city-size distribution, they do matter for individual city sizes, and they matter for productivity and
competition to a diﬀerent extent depending on the type of frictions we consider.
Our ﬁndings have clear-cut implications for future spatial modeling. As far as the city-size
distribution is concerned, our results suggest that we can abstract from either urban or trade
2frictions without loss of generality. Hence, the recent modeling strategies taken by Gabaix (1999),
Eeckhout (2004), Duranton (2007) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), where trade frictions
are assumed away, provide good approximations. However, to explain the rise and fall of individual
cities within the stable distribution requires a model that takes both types of spatial frictions into
account. Our results also suggest that such a model may be needed to understand productivity and
markup diﬀerences across cities.
What ingredients are required in our framework? Obviously, we need a system of cities as
in Henderson (1974), extended to include spatial frictions within and across cities. Both urban
and trade frictions are introduced in standard ways. For urban frictions, we use a monocentric city
model with commuting costs and land rents as in Alonso (1964) and Fujita (1989). To capture trade
frictions, we rely on a monopolistic competition model with trade costs as in the new trade theory
and the new economic geography (neg). However, workhorse constant elasticity of substitution
(ces) models such as Krugman (1980, 1991) do not account for the empirical facts that large cities
are more productive, more competitive, and allow for greater consumption diversity (see Syverson,
2004; Handbury and Weinstein, 2011).1 We incorporate all these aspects into a single framework
by building on recent developments in the heterogeneous ﬁrms literature. The two prominent
approaches, however, have limitations for our purpose: in Melitz (2003) the ces speciﬁcation implies
constant markups so that spatial frictions do not matter for competition; whereas in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) the quasi-linear speciﬁcation rules out income eﬀects of demand for varieties and,
more importantly, imposes restrictions on feasible city size diﬀerences.2 The latter feature is not
well suited to urban settings where observed city sizes substantially diﬀer and counterfactual city
sizes are a priori unknown.
To overcome those limitations, we develop a novel multi-city monopolistic competition framework
that allows for the joint determination of city sizes, productivities, markups, wages, consumption
diversity, and the number and size distribution of ﬁrms.3 City sizes are determined by aggregating
individual location decisions based on wages, rents, and prices, which in turn, are inﬂuenced by
spatial frictions and amenities. We model these location decisions by using discrete choice theory as
in McFadden (1974), and embed the choices into spatial equilibrium conditions following Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003).
Our multi-city framework features multiple margins of adjustment to shocks in spatial frictions.
Given the distribution of population, changes in spatial frictions directly aﬀect the productivity
advantage of cities and the nature of competition in cities. Such changes in productivity and
1Early work by Krugman (1979, Section 3.3) sheds light on the latter two issues, using an aspatial model with
variable elasticity of substitution (ves). Ottaviano et al. (2002) develop a neg model featuring ves in which large
markets are more competitive and have lower markups.
2More speciﬁcally, the quasi-linear framework requires that market size diﬀerences are bounded to maintain an
equilibrium with incomplete specialization (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008, footnote 18).
3Holmes et al. (2010) also depart from the ces and quasi-linear frameworks and develop a two-region neg model
building on Bernard et al. (2003) to explore the issues of productivity and regional agglomeration from a theoretical
perspective.
3competition, in turn, induce changes in indirect utility diﬀerences across cities – through changes
in wages, rents, and prices – thereby aﬀecting individual location decisions. Put diﬀerently, shocks
to spatial frictions are absorbed into: productivity and competition, as in the heterogeneous ﬁrms
literature; and population movements, as in the urban economics and neg literatures. Despite the
richness of our setting, we can derive clear comparative static results with two cities. We show
that, for a given population distribution, ﬁrms in the larger city face the higher wage and tougher
selection to oﬀset their advantage of having the larger local market. At the same time, commuting
costs and land rents are higher in the larger city, which reduces its attractiveness. Ceteris paribus,
eliminating urban frictions favors agglomeration by increasing the number of people who choose
the larger city, while eliminating trade frictions induces dispersion by making the smaller city more
attractive.
With these qualitative results in hand, we quantify the multi-city model for the US. We ﬁrst use
msa-level data on population, commuting time, and hours worked to compute city-speciﬁc measures
of urban frictions. Then we estimate a gravity equation for trade ﬂows to obtain a measure of trade
frictions. The friction parameters thus obtained are used in the market equilibrium conditions to
back out unobserved msa-level technological possibilities. This allows us to structurally identify
the parameters of ﬁrms’ productivity distributions by matching predicted and observed ﬁrm size
distributions. Finally, we use the spatial equilibrium conditions to perfectly ﬁt the observed US city-
size distribution. In doing so, we pin down the relative weight of economic variables and observed
amenities in determining individual location decisions, and back out measures of unobserved ameni-
ties at the msa level.4 We pay particular attention to model ﬁt and verify that our framework can
reproduce several empirical features at the msa and ﬁrm levels. For example, it fairly well replicates
the observed patterns of aggregate land rents that are linked to urban frictions. It also replicates
reasonably well the distribution of average wages across msas and matches available micro-evidence
on the spatial structure of US ﬁrms’ shipments (Hummels and Hilberry, 2008; Holmes and Stevens,
2010) that are linked to trade frictions.
Our quantitative analysis contributes to both the recent empirical neg and urban economics
literatures. Although the former literature has made some important progress recently (e.g., Hanson,
2005; Redding and Sturm, 2008; Redding, 2010; Combes and Lafourcade, 2011), neg models have
still been confronted with data mostly in a reduced-form manner. It is fair to say that few attempts
have been made to conduct comprehensive counterfactual experiments. One notable exception in
the urban economics literature is the recent paper by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010), who
investigate the contribution of diﬀerent wedges to the observed US city-size distribution. Unlike
the neg literature, however, their framework builds on a perfect competition model and abstracts
from trade between cities. Hence, it is not suited to investigate how trade frictions aﬀect city sizes,
productivity, and competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a single-city model
4Contrary to more conventional hedonic approaches (e.g., Roback, 1982; Albouy, 2008), unobserved amenities
and technological possibilities are obtained here from a model that encompasses both trade and urban frictions.
4to highlight some basic properties. In Section 3, we extend it to a multi-city framework and
provide comparative static results for the case with two cities. Section 4 describes our quantiﬁcation
procedure and discusses the model ﬁt. We then turn to our counterfactual experiments in Section 5.
Section 6 provides some extensions and discussion of our main results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Basic model: Single city
We consider a mass L > 0 of identical consumers/workers and a large amount of land that stretches
out on a two-dimensional featureless plane. Labor is the only factor of production and land is
used for housing only. Each agent consumes inelastically one unit of land, and the amount of land
available at each location is set to one. All ﬁrms in the city are located at an exogenously given
and dimensionless Central Business District (cbd). A monocentric city of size L then covers the
surface of a disk with radius ¯ x ≡
p
L/π, with the cbd located in the middle of that disk and the
workers evenly distributed within it.
We introduce urban frictions in a standard way into our model by assuming that agents have
to commute to the cbd for work. In particular, we assume that each individual is endowed with h
hours of time, which is the gross labor supply per capita (in terms of hours) including commuting
time. Commuting costs are of the ‘iceberg’ type: the eﬀective labor supply of a worker living at a
distance x ≤ ¯ x from the cbd is given by
s(x) = he
−θx, (1)
where θ ≥ 0 captures the eﬃciency loss due to commuting within the city.5 The total eﬀective labor




















In what follows, it will be useful to deﬁne the eﬀective labor supply per capita as h ≡ S/L, which
is the average number of hours worked in the city. It directly follows from (2) that S is positive
and increasing in L, while h is decreasing in L. That is, given gross labor supply per capita h and
commuting technology θ > 0, the eﬀective labor supply per capita is lower in a larger city. We can
further show that h is decreasing in θ, which captures urban frictions. With θ = 0, we would have
h = h regardless of the city size L.
Let w stand for the wage rate paid to the workers by the ﬁrms at the cbd. Then, the wage
income net of commuting costs earned by a worker residing at the city edge is ws(¯ x) = whe−θ¯ x.
5We use an exponential rather than a linear iceberg commuting cost (as in, e.g., Murata and Thisse, 2005) since
the linear speciﬁcation is subject to a boundary condition to ensure positive eﬀective labor supply at each location
in the city. Keeping track of this condition becomes tedious with multiple cities and intercity movements of people.
The negative exponential speciﬁcation has been used extensively in the literature (e.g., Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg,
2002), and the convexity of the eﬃciency loss with respect to distance from the cbd can also be justiﬁed in a modal
choice framework of intra-city transportation (e.g., Glaeser, 2008, pp.24–25).
5Because workers are identical, the wages net of commuting costs and land rents are equalized across
all locations in the city: ws(x)−R(x) = ws(¯ x)−R(¯ x), where R(x) is the land rent at a distance x
from the cbd. We normalize the opportunity cost of land at the urban fringe to zero, i.e., R(¯ x) = 0.
The equilibrium land rent schedule in the city is then given by R∗(x) = w(e−θx − e−θ¯ x)h, which























In what follows, we assume that each worker owns an equal share of the land in the city and has
an equal claim to ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Accordingly, in addition to the wage net of commuting costs and
land rent, each worker receives an equal share of aggregate land rents ALR, and an equal share of
aggregate proﬁts Π. The expenditure per capita is then given by E = whe
−θ
√
L/π + (ALR + Π)/L.
2.1 Preferences and demands
We assume that there is a continuum of horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties available for consump-
tion. Denote by Ω the endogenously determined set of varieties, with measure N. All consumers
have identical preferences that display ‘love of variety’ and give rise to demands with variable elas-
ticity. Following Behrens and Murata (2007), the utility maximization problem of a representative












p(j)q(j)dj = E, (4)
where p(j) > 0 and q(j) ≥ 0 stand for the price and the per capita consumption of variety j; and

































denote the average price and the diﬀerential entropy of the price distribution, respectively.6 Since
marginal utility at zero consumption is bounded, the demand for a variety need not be positive.
Indeed, as can be seen from (5), the demand for variety i is positive if and only if its price is lower
than the reservation price pd. Formally,




6As shown in Reza (1994, pp.278–279), the diﬀerential entropy η takes its maximum value when there is no price
dispersion, i.e., p(i) = p for all i ∈ Ω. In that case, we would observe η = −ln(1/N) and thus q(i) = E/(Np)
by (5). Behrens and Murata (2007) entirely focus on such a symmetric case. By contrast, this paper considers ﬁrm
heterogeneity so that not only the average price p, but also the entire price distribution matters for the demand q(i).
The diﬀerential entropy η in (5) does capture the dispersion of the price distribution.
6Note that the reservation price pd is a function of the price aggregates p and η. Combining expres-










Observe that the price elasticity of demand for variety i is given by 1/[αq(i)]. Thus, if individuals
consume more of this variety (which is, e.g., the case when their expenditure increases), they become
less price sensitive. Last, since e−αq(i) = p(i)/pd, the indirect utility is given by











2.2 Technology and market structure
Each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm. The labor market is perfectly competitive so that all
ﬁrms at the cbd take the wage rate w as given. Prior to production, each ﬁrm enters the market by
engaging in research and development, which requires a ﬁxed amount F of labor paid at the market
wage. Each ﬁrm i discovers its marginal labor requirement m(i) ≥ 0, expressed in terms of hours
of labor required per unit of output, only after making this irreversible entry decision. We assume
that m(i) is drawn from a common and known, continuously diﬀerentiable distribution G. Since F
is sunk, an entrant will stay in the market provided it can charge a price p(i) above marginal cost






where q(i) is given by (7). Since there is a continuum of ﬁrms, no individual ﬁrm has any impact
on the reservation price. All ﬁrms therefore take pd as given, so that the ﬁrst-order conditions for









, ∀i ∈ Ω. (10)
A price distribution satisfying (10) is called a price equilibrium. Equations (7) and (10) imply that
q(i) = (1/α)[1 − m(i)w/p(i)]. Thus, the minimum output is given by q(i) = 0 at p(i) = m(i)w
which, by (10), implies that p(i) = pd. The cutoﬀ marginal labor requirement for surviving in the
market is then deﬁned as md ≡ pd/w. All ﬁrms that draw m ≥ md choose not to produce, whereas
all ﬁrms with a draw m < md will operate in equilibrium. Hence, given a mass of entrants NE, only
a fraction G(md) of them will have positive output. The mass of surviving ﬁrms, which is identical
to the mass of varieties consumed in the single city case, is then given by N = NEG(md).
Since ﬁrms diﬀer by their marginal labor requirement only, we can write down all ﬁrm-level
variables in terms of m. Solving (10) by using the Lambert W function, deﬁned as ϕ = W(ϕ)eW(ϕ),












−1 + W − 2
￿
, (11)
where we suppress the argument em/md of W to alleviate notation. It is readily veriﬁed that
W ′ > 0 for all non-negative arguments and that W(0) = 0 and W(e) = 1. Hence, 0 ≤ W ≤ 1 if
0 ≤ m ≤ md. The expressions in (11) then show that a ﬁrm with a draw md charges a price equal to
marginal cost, faces zero demand, and earns zero operating proﬁt. Since W ′ > 0, we readily obtain
∂p(m)/∂m > 0, ∂q(m)/∂m < 0 and ∂π(m)/∂m < 0. In words, ﬁrms with better productivity draws
charge lower prices, sell larger quantities, and earn higher operating proﬁts as in Melitz (2003). Yet,









implies that ∂Λ(m)/∂m < 0. Unlike Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), who use quasi-linear prefer-
ences, we incorporate this feature into a full-ﬂedged general equilibrium model with income eﬀects
for varieties and without restrictions on feasible city size diﬀerences. Since ∂W/∂md < 0, ﬁrm-
level markups are also smaller in tougher markets, which is in line with ﬁrm-level evidence (see
Syverson, 2004).
2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions in the single city case consist of zero expected proﬁts and labor market
clearing. These two conditions can be solved for the cutoﬀ md and the mass of entrants NE. Using




[p(m) − mw]q(m)dG(m) = Fw. (13)








−1 + W − 2
￿
dG(m) = F, (14)
which yields a unique equilibrium cutoﬀ because the left-hand side of (14) is strictly increasing in










7Further details about the Lambert W function, the technical properties of which are key to making our model
tractable, can be found in Appendix A.2 of Behrens et al. (2009).
8From (13) and NER m
d
0 p(m)q(m)dG(m) = E, we obtain EL/(wNE) = L
R m
d
0 mq(m)dG(m) + F which, together
with (15), yields E = (S/L)w = hw in equilibrium. The expenditure of the representative consumer thus depends
only on the eﬀective labor supply per capita and the wage rate.








m(1 − W)dG(m) + F
#
= S. (16)
Given the equilibrium cutoﬀ md from (14), equation (16) can be uniquely solved for NE. As in
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and many other existing studies, we choose a particular distribution






where mmax > 0 and k ≥ 1 are the upper bound and the shape parameter, respectively. This
distribution is useful for deriving analytical results and taking the model to the data. In particular,















where κ1 and κ2 are positive constants that solely depend on k (see Appendices B.1 and B.2 for
details). The term  max ≡
￿
αF(mmax)k￿
/κ2 can be interpreted as an inverse measure of technological
possibilities: the lower is the ﬁxed labor requirement for entry, F, or the lower is the upper bound,
mmax, the lower is  max.
How do population size and technological possibilities aﬀect entry and selection? Recall from
(2) that the total eﬀective labor supply, S, is increasing in population L. The second expression in
(17) then shows that there are more entrants in a larger city. The ﬁrst expression in (17), in turn,
shows that a larger L or a smaller  max entail a smaller cutoﬀ and, thus, a lower survival probability
G(md) of entrants. This tougher selection maps into higher average productivity, 1/m, since m ≡
(1/N)
R
Ω m(i)di = [k/(k + 1)]md under a Pareto distribution. Observe that for now in our model,
larger cities are more productive because of tougher selection, but not because of technological
externalities associated with agglomeration. In line with an abundant empirical literature (e.g.,
Rosenthal and Strange, 2004), we extend our framework to allow for such agglomeration economies
in Section 6. All of our theoretical and quantitative key insights are robust to that extension.
We can also study the mass of surviving ﬁrms and the average markup faced by the consumers














Since those ﬁrms are heterogeneous and have diﬀerent markups and market shares, the simple
(unweighted) average of markups is not an adequate measure of consumers’ exposure to market















9where κ3 is a positive constant that solely depends on k (see Appendix B.3).9 Note that the weighted
average of markups is proportional to the cutoﬀ. It thus follows from (18) and (19) that our model
displays pro-competitive eﬀects since Λ = [κ3/(κ1 + κ2)](1/N) decreases with the mass of ﬁrms
competing in the city.

















where the term in square brackets is, by construction of the utility function, positive for all k ≥ 1.
Alternatively, the indirect utility can be rewritten as U = [1/(k + 1) − (κ1 + κ2)]N. Hence, as can
be seen from expressions (17)–(20), a city with better technological possibilities allows for higher
utility because of tougher selection, tougher competition, and greater consumption diversity.
Finally, the impact of city size on consumption diversity, on the weighted average of markups,


























The term in braces in (21) equals the eﬀective labor supply per capita, h = S/L, which decreases
with L. The last term in (21) captures the cutoﬀ productivity level, 1/md, which increases with L.
The net eﬀect of an increase in L on the indirect utility U is thus ambiguous, highlighting the
trade-oﬀ between a dispersion force (urban frictions) and an agglomeration force (tougher ﬁrm
selection) inherent in our model. Yet, it can be shown that U is single-peaked with respect to L
(see Appendix A.2). Since the indirect utility is proportional to N, it immediately follows that
consumption diversity also exhibits a ∩-shaped pattern, while the weighted average of markups Λ
is ∪-shaped with respect to L.
3 Urban system: Multiple cities
We now turn to the case with multiple cities and endogenous location decisions. The timing of
events is as follows. First, workers/consumers choose their locations. Second, ﬁrm entry, selection
and production take place.10 We start the analysis by describing preferences and technology, as
well as trade frictions, for this urban system with K asymmetric cities. We then derive the mar-
ket equilibrium conditions, given city sizes, and deﬁne the spatial equilibrium where individuals
endogenously choose their locations. Finally, we analyze the two-city case to build intuition for
our counterfactual experiments. The internal structure of cities is analogous to that in the previ-
ous section, but cities may diﬀer in their commuting technologies θr and gross labor supplies hr.
Preferences and technology are also analogous, and we indicate changes wherever needed.
9Recent work by Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) uses a similar (expenditure share) weighted average of markups
in a translog framework to quantify the impacts of international trade on the US price level.
10This timing simpliﬁes our model because we need not specify which types of ﬁrms relocate as workers move
across cities. The spatial sorting of ﬁrms or workers is not the topic of the present paper.
103.1 Preferences and demands
Let psr(i) and qsr(i) denote the price and the per capita consumption of variety i produced in city s
















psr(j)qsr(j)dj = Er, (22)
where Ωsr denotes the set of varieties produced in city s and consumed in city r.11 It is readily

















, ∀i ∈ Ωsr,
where Nc
























denote the (unweighted) average price and the diﬀerential entropy of the price distribution of all
varieties consumed in city r, respectively. As in the case of a single city, the demand for a locally
produced variety i (resp., a non-locally produced variety j) is positive if and only if the price of
variety i (resp., of variety j) is lower than the reservation price pd
r. Formally,
qrr(i) > 0 ⇐⇒ prr(i) < p
d






rpr)−ηr is a function of the price aggregates pr and ηr. The demands for




















Since e−αqsr(j) = psr(j)/pd





















3.2 Technology and market structure
We consider segmented markets, where resale or third-party arbitrage are suﬃciently costly, and
assume that ﬁrms are free to price discriminate between markets. Firms in city r independently
draw their value of m from a city-speciﬁc distribution Gr. We introduce trade frictions into our
11We assume that land is collectively owned in each city, and that every resident has an equal claim to aggregate
land rents in that city. As ﬁrms make zero aggregate proﬁts, this implies that Er = (Sr/Lr)wr = hrwr.
11model by assuming that shipments from r to s are subject to costs τrs > 1 for all r and s, which







Lsqrs(i)[prs(i) − τrsmr(i)wr]. (25)
Each ﬁrm maximizes (25) with respect to its prices prs(i) separately. Since it has no impact on the










, ∀i ∈ Ωrs. (26)
Equations (23) and (26) imply that qrs(i) = (1/α)[1−τrsmr(i)wr/prs(i)], which shows that qrs(i) = 0
at prs(i) = τrsmr(i)wr. It then follows from (26) that prs(i) = pd
s. Hence, a ﬁrm located in r with
draw mx
rs ≡ pd
s/(τrswr) is just indiﬀerent between selling and not selling in city s. All ﬁrms in r with
draws below mx
rs are productive enough to sell to city s.13 In what follows, we refer to mx
ss ≡ md
s
as the internal cutoﬀ in city s, whereas mx
rs with r  = s is the external cutoﬀ for selling to city s











Expression (27) reveals the key relationship between trade costs, wages, and productivity. In par-
ticular, it shows how trade costs and wage diﬀerences aﬀect ﬁrms’ ability to break into market s.
When wages are equalized (wr = ws) and local trade is less costly than external trade (τss < τrs),
all external cutoﬀs must fall short of the internal cutoﬀs. Breaking into market s is then always
harder for ﬁrms in r  = s than for ﬁrms in s, which is the standard case considered in the literature
(e.g., Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). However, consider a case where ws > wr. In that
case, ﬁrms from the low wage city r may have a cost advantage in selling to the high wage market s
compared to the local competitors there. Surviving in market s is then easier for ﬁrms selling from
r than for local ﬁrms in s, i.e., mx
rs > md
s. More generally, because of wage diﬀerences and trade
costs, the usual ranking mx
rs < md
s prevails only when τssws < τrswr.
Given a mass of entrants NE
r and external cutoﬀs mx
rs, only Np
r = NE
r Gr (maxs {mx
rs}) ﬁrms
survive in city r, namely those which are productive enough to sell at least in one market (which
need not be the local market in our model in the presence of wage diﬀerences across cities). The











12We allow for internal trade costs τrr > 1 in order to capture the empirical fact that ﬁrms also incur shipping and
distribution costs in their local markets.
13Unlike in the ces model by Melitz (2003), we need not assume ﬁxed costs for ‘exporting’ to explain why some
ﬁrms do not ship to some cities. The reason is that, for each variety, marginal utility at zero consumption is ﬁnite in
our model. While ﬁxed costs of exporting are certainly pervasive in an international context, they appear much less
plausible at the city or the zip code level within a country (also see Hillberry and Hummels, 2008).
12which is the sum of all ﬁrms that are productive enough to serve market r.
As in the case of a single city, the ﬁrst-order conditions (26) can be solved by using the Lam-












−1 + W − 2), (29)
where we suppress the argument eτrsmwr/pd
s of W. It can be readily veriﬁed that more productive
ﬁrms again charge lower prices, sell larger quantities, and earn higher operating proﬁts than less




We ﬁrst examine the market equilibrium for given population sizes in the general case with K asym-
metric cities. We assume that productivity draws 1/m follow Pareto distributions with identical
shape parameters k ≥ 1, but the upper bounds are allowed to vary across cities, i.e., Gr(m) =
(m/mmax
r )
k. Given that assumption, the equilibrium conditions – zero expected proﬁts, labor mar-











































r ≡ [αF (mmax
r )






































The 3×K conditions (30)–(32) depend on 3×K unknowns: the wages, wr, the masses of entrants,
NE
r , and the internal cutoﬀs, md
r. The external cutoﬀs, mx
rs, can then be recovered from (27).









13Thus, the mass of entrants in city r still depends positively on that city’s eﬀective labor supply Sr
and negatively on the ﬁxed labor requirement F. Adding the term in r that is missing on both

















Expressions (31) and (34) jointly summarize how wages, technological possibilites, cutoﬀs, trade
costs, population sizes, and eﬀective labor supplies are related in the market equilibrium.
Using the foregoing expressions, we can show that the mass of varieties consumed in a city is










Furthermore, the (expenditure share) weighted average of markups that consumers face in city r






















Hence, it immediately follows from (35) and (36) that there are pro-competitive eﬀects, since Λr
decreases with the mass Nc
r of ﬁrms competing in city r as Λr = [κ3/(κ1 + κ2)](1/Nc
r). Last, we





















which implies that greater eﬀective labor supply per capita, tougher selection, and a lower weighted
average of markups in city r translate into higher welfare. Alternatively, the indirect utility can be
rewritten as Ur = [1/(k+1)−(κ1+κ2)]Nc
r, i.e., it is proportional to the mass of varieties consumed
in a city.
3.3.2 Spatial equilibrium
We now introduce city-speciﬁc amenities and taste heterogeneity in residential location into our
model. This is done for two reasons. First, individuals in reality choose their location not only
based on wages, prices and productivities that result from market interactions, but also based on
non-market features such as amenities (e.g., climate or landscape). Second, individuals do not
necessarily react in the same way to regional gaps in wages and cost-of-living (Tabuchi and Thisse,
2002; Murata, 2003). Such taste heterogeneity tends to oﬀset the extreme outcome that often
arises in typical neg models, namely that all mobile economic activity concentrates in a single
city. When we take our model to data, taste heterogeneity is thus useful for capturing an observed
non-degenerate equilibrium distribution of city sizes.
14We assume that the location choice of an individual ℓ is described by linear random utility as
V ℓ
r = Ur+Ar+ξℓ
r, where Ur is given by (37) and Ar subsumes city-speciﬁc amenities that are equally




r refers to observed amenities such as costal location and Au
r to the unobserved part. Finally,
the random variable ξℓ
r captures idiosyncratic taste diﬀerences in residential location. Following
McFadden (1974), we assume that the ξℓ
r are i.i.d. across individuals and cities according to a
double exponential distribution with zero mean and variance equal to π2β2/6, where β is a positive
constant. Since β has a positive relationship with variance, the larger the value of β, the more
heterogeneous are the workers’ attachments to each city. Given the population distribution, an
















If β → 0, people choose their location based only on Ur +Ar. This corresponds to the case without
taste heterogeneity, i.e., they choose a city with the highest Ur + Ar with probability one. By
contrast, if β → ∞, individuals choose their location with equal probability 1/K. In that case,
taste for residential location is extremely heterogeneous, so that Ur + Ar does not aﬀect location





In words, the choice probability of each city is equal to the population share of that city.
3.4 Some analytical results
To build intuition for our counterfactual experiments, we now illustrate how spatial frictions aﬀect
the fundamental trade-oﬀ between agglomeration and dispersion forces in the special case with two
cities. We assume that trade costs are symmetric (τ12 = τ21 = τ and τ11 = τ22 = t), and that
intra-city trade is less costly than inter-city trade (t ≤ τ). For given city sizes L1 and L2, the
market equilibrium is given by a system of three equations (31)–(33) with three unknowns (the two
internal cutoﬀs md
1 and md
















































where ρ ≡  max
2 / max
1 and σ ≡ h2/h1 = (S2/L2)/(S1/L1). When t < τ, equations (40) and (41) can

















1 − (t/τ)2k , (43)





ρ − (t/τ)k ωk+1
ωk+1 − ρ (t/τ)k ≡ RHS. (44)
When t < τ, the RHS of (44) is non-negative if and only if ω < ω < ω, where ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (t/τ)
k/(k+1)
and ω ≡ ρ1/(k+1) (τ/t)
k/(k+1). Furthermore, the RHS is strictly decreasing in ω ∈ (ω,ω) with
limω→ω+ RHS = ∞ and limω→ω− RHS = 0. Since the LHS of (44) is strictly increasing in ω ∈ (0,∞),
there exists a unique equilibrium relative wage ω∗ ∈ (ω,ω).
Consider two cities that diﬀer in size but are identical with respect to their gross labor supplies,
commuting technologies, and technological possibilities (h1 = h2 = h, θ1 = θ2 = θ, and ρ = 1).
Then, the larger city has the higher wage and the lower cutoﬀ. To see this, observe ﬁrst that
L1/L2 = 1 implies S1/S2 = 1, so that the unique equilibrium wage is ω∗ = 1 by (44). Now
suppose that city 1 is larger than city 2, i.e., L1/L2 > 1, which implies S1/S2 > 1. Then, the
equilibrium relative wage satisﬁes ω∗ > 1 because an increase in S1/S2 raises the RHS of (44)






￿k+1. As L1 > L2 implies ω > 1 and σ > 1 (recall that h ≡ S/L is decreasing
in L), it follows that md
1 < md
2. Hence, the larger city has the lower cutoﬀ. The intuition is that
the larger city has an advantage in terms of the larger local market due to trade frictions, and that
this advantage must be oﬀset by the higher wage and tougher selection.
As can be seen from (37), the higher productivity (lower cutoﬀ) constitutes an agglomeration
force as it raises indirect utility in the larger city. Yet, the larger city also has lower eﬀective
labor supply per capita hr = Sr/Lr due to urban frictions, which negatively aﬀects indirect utility,
thus representing a dispersion force.14 In the case of two cities, the choice probabilities (38) that








where Υ ≡ (U1 −U2)+(A1 −A2). Hence, P1 is increasing and P2 is decreasing in Υ. Plugging (37)

















+ (A1 − A2). (45)
In what follows, we focus on the case where L1 > L2 and A1 = A2. Then, by (39) the spatial
equilibrium is such that P1 > P2, which implies Υ > 0 and h1/md
1 > h2/md
2 by (45). The larger city
then has greater consumption diversity according to (35) and a lower average markup according to
(36) than the smaller city.
14Recall that the gross labor supply, hr, is exogenous in our model. When quantifying the model in Section 4,
we use data on hr across msas, which shows that hr is higher in big cities like New York. In this subsection, we
abstract from such an “urban rat race” that would work against the eﬀect of urban frictions by raising the eﬀective
labor supply per capita, hr, in the larger city. A better commuting technology (lower θr) in the larger city would
also work in the same direction.
163.4.1 No urban frictions
Our ﬁrst counterfactual experiment will be to eliminate urban frictions while leaving trade frictions
unchanged. This is equivalent to setting θ = 0, holding τ and t constant. In what follows, we
consider – starting from the initial spatial equilibrium – how Υ is aﬀected by such a change. This
allows us to study if the elimination of urban frictions involves more agglomeration (larger P1)
or more dispersion (smaller P1). Let e Υ be the value of Υ in the counterfactual scenario, keeping
city sizes ﬁxed at their initial levels. Other counterfactual values are also denoted with a tilde.
Observing that e h1 = e h2 = h when θ = 0, we have
sign
n
































where the ﬁrst two terms stand for the direct eﬀects of eliminating urban frictions and the second
two terms capture the indirect eﬀects through the cutoﬀs. In the initial situation where θ > 0, we
know that h1 < h2 < h as urban frictions are greater in the larger city. We also know that md
1 < md
2
holds even without urban frictions as L1 > L2, so that e md
1 < e md
2. Hence, the ﬁrst positive term
always dominates the second negative term, thus showing that the direct eﬀects favor the large city
by increasing the probability P1 of choosing city 1. However, the indirect eﬀects through the cutoﬀs
work against this. To see this, notice that the reduction in θ from any given positive value to zero
raises S1/S2 (see Appendix A.6) and thus the relative wage ω by shifting up the RHS of (44). We
thus observe wage divergence. The expressions in (43) then show that the cutoﬀ increases in the
large city to oﬀset the cost disadvantage, whereas it decreases in the small city. In other words,
we have md
1 < e md
1 < e md
2 < md
2. Hence, both the third and fourth terms are negative, so that the
indirect eﬀects through the cutoﬀs work against agglomeration.
If the direct eﬀects dominate the indirect eﬀects, we have e Υ > Υ so that P1 increases and
the large city becomes even larger as urban frictions are eliminated. The increase in population
then leads to a productivity gain, which may oﬀset the productivity drop at a given population
size (md
1 < e md
1). As we show below, such a pattern indeed emerges in the quantiﬁed multi-city
model (see Figures 5, 7 and 12): Big cities like New York become even larger. Given the initial
population, productivity goes down in New York while it goes up once we take population changes
into account (see also Section 6.1 below). By the same argument, small cities may end up with a
lower productivity due to the loss in population. Hence, the elimination of urban frictions makes
the overall productivity change ambiguous.
3.4.2 No trade frictions
Our second counterfactual experiment will be to eliminate trade frictions while leaving urban fric-
tions unchanged. More speciﬁcally, we consider a scenario where consumers face the same trade
costs for local and non-local varieties. This is equivalent to setting τ = t, holding θ constant. As
before, let e Υ be the value of Υ in the counterfactual scenario, while keeping city sizes ﬁxed at the
17initial level. Other counterfactual values, given the initial population distribution, are also denoted
with a tilde. Noting that h1 and h2 remain constant, the change in Υ can now be written as
sign
n






























2 (see Appendix A.6). Both cities therefore experience a productivity gain. The ﬁrst term
in the square brackets in (47) is thus positive, while the second term is negative. We can show that,
when switching to a world without trade frictions, e Υ < Υ holds if ρ1/(k+1) ≤ σ (see Appendix A.6).
In other words, the large city becomes smaller if the two cities are initially not too diﬀerent in terms
of their technological possibilities. In contrast, the small city becomes larger and, consequently,
experiences a further productivity gain. We show below that these analytical results are consistent
with the pattern that emerges in our quantiﬁed multi-city model (see Figures 9 and 11): small cities
tend to gain population, and they experience stronger gains in productivity than large cities.15
4 Quantiﬁcation
We now take our multi-city model to the data by estimating or calibrating its parameters (see
Appendix D for the data description). Our procedure can be summarized in the following 6 steps:
1. Using the deﬁnition of total eﬀective labor supply and data on commuting time, hours worked,
and city size at the msa level, we obtain the city-speciﬁc commuting technology parameters
b θr that constitute urban frictions.
2. Using the speciﬁcation τrs ≡ dγ
rs, where drs is the distance from r to s, we estimate a gravity
equation that relates the value of bilateral trade ﬂows to distance. For a given value of the
Pareto shape parameter k, we obtain the distance elasticity b γ that constitutes trade frictions.
3. The estimated distance elasticity, together with data on labor supply, value added per worker,
and city size, allows us to back out the set of city-speciﬁc technological possibilities b  max
r and
wages b wr that are consistent with the market equilibrium conditions.
4. Using the set of city-speciﬁc technological possibilities thus obtained, we draw a large sample
of ﬁrms from within the model to compute the diﬀerence between the simulated and observed
establishment size distributions.
15Other two-region neg models with commuting costs (Tabuchi, 1998; Murata and Thisse, 2005) would come
to qualitatively similar conclusions about how falling transport or commuting costs aﬀect the spatial equilibrium.
Helpman (1998) considers a ﬁxed supply of land instead of commuting, but his model would also display a similar
pattern as falling transport costs are dispersive, while greater abundance of land is agglomerative. Though useful for
illustrative purposes, such two-region examples do not deliver a sense of magnitude about the quantitative importance
of spatial frictions in practice, however. They are also silent on productivity.
185. Iterating through steps 2 to 4, we search over the parameter space to ﬁnd the value of the
Pareto shape parameter k that minimizes the sum of squared diﬀerences between the simulated
and observed establishment size distributions.
6. Using the spatial equilibrium conditions, the expression of indirect utility, and data on natural
amenities, we obtain a measure of unobservable consumption amenities and the relative weight
of economic factors and amenities that are consistent with the observed city-size distribution.
In what follows, we explain each step in more detail.
4.1 Urban frictions θr
To obtain the city-speciﬁc commuting technology parameters b θr that constitute urban frictions, we





















where we use Sr = Lrhr. We compute hr as the average number of hours worked per week in
msa r. The gross labor supply per capita, hr, which is the endowment of hours available for work
and commuting, is constructed as the sum of hr and hours per week spent by workers in each msa
for travel-to-work commuting in 2007. Given hr, hr, as well as city size Lr, the above equation can
be uniquely solved for the city-speciﬁc commuting parameter b θr. Table 1 provides their values for
the 356 msas, which are further discussed in Section 4.6.
4.2 Trade frictions τrs
To estimate the distance elasticity b γ that constitutes trade frictions, we consider the value of sales
























Turning to the speciﬁcation of trade costs τrs, we stick to standard practice and assume that
τrs ≡ dγ
rs, where drs stands for the distance from r to s (measured in kilometers and computed using
the great circle formula). The gravity equation can then be rewritten in log-linear stochastic form
as






s + εrs, (50)




rs is a zero-ﬂow dummy, and εrs is an error term with the usual properties for ols
19consistency.16 Using aggregate bilateral trade ﬂows Xrs in 2007 for the 48 contiguous US states
that cover all msas used in the subsequent analysis, we estimate the gravity equation on state-to-
state trade ﬂows.17 Given a value of k, we thus obtain an estimate of the distance elasticity b γ.
4.3 Market equilibrium conditions (wr, max
r )




































Ideally, we would like to use data on technological possibilities  max
r to solve for the wages and
cutoﬀs. Yet,  max
r is unobservable. We thus solve for wages and technological possibilities (b wr, b  max
r )
by using the values of md
r that are obtained as follows. Under the Pareto distribution, we have
(1/mr) = [k/(k + 1)](1/md
r), where 1/mr is the average productivity in msa r. The latter can be
computed as GDP per employee, using data on GDP of msa r and the total number of hours worked
in that msa (hours worked per week times total employment). Given an estimate of 1/mr and the
value of k, we can compute the cutoﬀs md
r. Using the value of k, the cutoﬀs md
r, the city-speciﬁc
commuting technologies b θr, the observed msa populations Lr, as well as trade frictions b τrs = db γ
rs,
we can solve (51) and (52) for the wages and unobserved technological possibilities (b wr, b  max
r ) that
are consistent with the market equilibrium. We compare in Section 4.7 the predicted wages b wr with
observed wages at the msa level to assess how well our model ﬁts the data.
4.4 Firm size distribution and Pareto shape parameter k
The quantiﬁcation procedure described thus far has assumed a given value of the shape parameter k.
In order to estimate k structurally, we proceed as follows. First, given a value of k, we can compute
trade frictions b τrs and the wages and cutoﬀs (b wr, b  max
r ) as described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. This,
together with the internal cutoﬀ md
r computed from data as described in Section 4.3, yields the
16There are 179 ‘zero ﬂows’ out of 2,304 in the data, i.e., 7.7% of the sample. We control for them by using a
standard dummy-variable approach, where I0
rs takes value 1 if Xrs = 0 and 0 otherwise. Note that these ﬂows are
not true zeros as we exclude Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington DC (see the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey (cfs) data).
Rather, they are unreported observations because of lack of statistical precision, so that a Heckman-type correction
procedure is not warranted.
17We work at the state level since msa trade ﬂows from the cfs public ﬁles can only be meaningfully exploited
for a relatively small sample of large ‘cfs regions’. Duranton et al. (2011, p.10) work with aggregate trade ﬂows for
“65 cfs regions organized around the core county of a us metropolitan area” to estimate the distance elasticity. We
used their estimate as a robustness check, and our results are little sensitive.
20external cutoﬀs b mx
rs by (27). With that information in hand, we can compute the share b νr of
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p
























denotes the number of ﬁrms operating in msa r. The total eﬀective labor supply Sr is computed as
in Section 4.1. Note that b νr is independent of the unobservable constant scaling α/(κ1 + κ2) that
multiplies the number of ﬁrms. The distribution of marginal labor requirements of surviving ﬁrms





Second, we draw a large sample of ﬁrms from our calibrated msa-level productivity distributions
b Gr. For that sample to be representative, we draw ﬁrms in msa r in proportion to its share b νr. For




















where b χrs = 1 if m < b mx
rs (the establishment can sell to msa s) and zero otherwise (the establishment
cannot sell to msa s). Since we can identify employment only up to some positive scaling coeﬃcient
(which depends on the unobservable α) we choose, without loss of generality, that coeﬃcient such
that the average employment per ﬁrm in our sample of establishments matches the observed average
employment in the 2007 cbp. Doing so allows us to readily compare the generated and observed
data as we can sort the sampled ﬁrms into the same size bins as those used for the observed ﬁrms.
We use four standard employment size bins from the cbp: ι = {1–19, 20–99, 100–499, 500+}
employees. Let NSIM
(ι) and NCBP
(ι) denote the number of ﬁrms in each size bin ι in our sample and in
the cbp, respectively. Let also NSIM and NCBP denote our sample size and the observed number
of establishments in the cbp. Given a value of k, the following statistic is a natural measure of the













the value of which depends on the chosen k. It is clear from (53) that we can choose any large sample
size NSIM since it would not aﬀect the ratio NSIM
(ι) /NSIM. Without loss of generality, we choose the
sample size such that the total number of simulated ﬁrms operating matches the observed total
number of establishments (NSIM = NCBP). There are 6,431,884 establishments across our 356 msas
in the 2007 cbp, and we sample the same number of ﬁrms from our quantiﬁed model.19 We ﬁnally
choose k by minimizing SS(k).
18We exclude the labor used for shipping goods and the sunk initial labor requirement.
19Doing so allows for a direct comparison of NSIM
(ι) and NCBP
(ι) for each ι. The very small diﬀerences in the aggregate
numbers reported in Tables 2 and 3 are due to rounding as the number of ﬁrms in each msa has to be an integer.
214.5 Spatial equilibrium conditions Ar
Our ﬁnal step is to take into account the spatial equilibrium conditions. Recall that the choice
probabilities are given by (38). Setting U1 + A1 ≡ 0 as a normalization, and using the observed
values of Lr for the 356 msas, the spatial equilibrium conditions Pr = Lr/L for r = 2,3,...,K can
be uniquely solved for (Ur + Ar)/β.20 We thus obtain the values of (Ur + Ar)/β that replicate the








, b D1 = 0. (54)
We then regress b Dr on our measure of indirect utility b Ur and data on natural amenities Ao
r to gauge
their relative importance:
b Dr = α0 + α1b Ur + α2A
o
r + εr, (55)
where b Ur is obtained from (37) using our measures of Lr, Sr, and md
r, as well as the estimate of
b τrr.21 Estimating the coeﬃcients on indirect utility b Ur and natural amenities Ao
r allows us to solve
the issue of how to weight these two terms appropriately in consumers’ location choices. The ﬁtted
residuals b εr can be interpreted as the implicit measure of the unobserved part of the msa amenities.
We hence let b Au
r ≡ b εr. By construction, that measure is uncorrelated with Ao
r and does not capture
natural amenities such as climate or access to the sea that are subsumed by Ao
r.
4.6 Quantiﬁcation results
Concerning the Pareto shape parameter, our iterative procedure yields b k = 6.4 that minimizes the
sum of squared diﬀerences between the observed and computed ﬁrm size distributions by size bins.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show that, despite having only a single degree of freedom, the ﬁt to
the observed distribution is rather good, with the model somewhat under-predicting the number of
small establishments and over-predicting the number of large establishments.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Turning to spatial frictions, we ﬁrst use (48) to obtain an estimate for the commuting technology
parameters that constitute urban frictions for each msa. As can be seen from Table 1, the values of
b θr range from 0.0708 (Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana and New York-Northern New Jersey-Long
Island) and 0.0867 (Chicago-Naperville-Joliet) to 0.9995 (Yuba City, CA) and 1.4824 (Hinesville-
Fort Stewart, GA). Thus, big cities tend to have better commuting technologies.22
20Since
PK
r=1 Pr = 1, the above equations are not independent. We drop the ﬁrst one without loss of generality.
21Due to the speciﬁcation in (55), neglecting multiplicative constants in (37) does not aﬀect our results.
22For any given distance x from the cbd, a smaller θ implies that people spend less time to commute to the cbd.
However, this does not necessarily mean that average commuting time is smaller in larger cities because of longer
commuting distances.
22We then use (50) to obtain an estimate for the distance elasticity that constitutes trade frictions.
Our ﬁxed eﬀects estimation of the gravity equation yields c γk = 1.2918 (with standard error 0.0271)
which, given b k = 6.4, implies b γ = 0.2018. Our estimate c γk for the year 2007 closely matches the
value of 1.348 reported by Hillberry and Hummels (2008) from estimation of a gravity equation at
the 3-digit zip code level using the 1997 conﬁdential cfs microdata. It is larger than the value of
γk = 0.82 reported by Duranton et al. (2011) which is obtained from a small sample of large cfs
regions. Our subsequent results do not change qualitatively and change little quantitatively when
using their estimate of the distance elasticity as a robustness check.
Having solved equations (54) for b Dr, we run a simple ols estimation of (55), which yields:








r + b εr. (56)
Consistent with theory, both indirect utility and natural amenities signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the spatial
distribution of population across msas, with both coeﬃcients being positive as expected. Table 1 fur-
ther reports the observed msa populations (scaled by their mean, i.e., Lr/L), average productivities
(1/mr) and observed amenity scores Ao
r, as well as the estimated/calibrated values of technological
possibilities b  max
r and unobserved consumption amenities b Au
r ≡ b εr.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the spatial distribution of natural amenities, unobserved amenities, tech-
nological possibilities, and commuting technologies. There are several points worth emphasizing
here. First, our quantiﬁed model yields detailed spatial patterns of unobserved consumption ameni-
ties and technological possibilities, the latter of which may be viewed as a measure for msa-level
production amenities. In contrast to, e.g., Roback (1982) and Albouy (2008), our amenity measures
are derived from a framework where geography matters as trade frictions are explicitly taken into
account. Both natural and unobserved amenities are positively correlated with city size, the corre-
lation being stronger for the latter (0.7023) than for the former (0.1334). Larger cities thus tend
to have better unobserved consumption amenities. Second, while the correlation between natural
and unobserved amenities is zero by construction, there is also little correlation between technolog-
ical possibilities and the two types of consumption amenities (-0.0867 and 0.0713 for Ao
r and b Au
r,
respectively). This is consistent with the results by Chen and Rosenthal (2008) who ﬁnd that good
business locations in the US often have low consumption amenities, and vice versa.
4.7 msa- and ﬁrm-level model ﬁt
Our model can replicate several features of the data, both at the msa and ﬁrm levels, that have not
been used in the quantiﬁcation procedure. We ﬁrst compute the correlation between actual relative
wages and those predicted by our model (see Appendix D for details on the data). The correlation
is 0.7379 and thus reasonably high. We can also replicate the distribution of establishments across
msas. Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the number of
23establishments (top part) and average establishment size (bottom part) at the msa level, and the
number of establishments is further broken down by employment size. The last column of Table 2
reports the correlation between the observed and our simulated data, which shows that the simple
cross-msa correlation between the observed and simulated total number of establishments is 0.7253,
with a slightly larger rank correlation of 0.733. Again, these are reasonably large numbers. Turning
to each size class, the ﬁt is less good for small ﬁrms (size class 1–19) with a correlation of 0.3824.
However, our model replicates fairly well the numbers of medium-sized and large establishments
(size classes 20–99, 100–499 and 500+) across msas. This can be seen from the mean across msas,
the corresponding standard deviations, and the minimum and maximum values. Furthermore, the
correlations between the observed and predicted numbers of establishments across msas are fairly
high (between 0.889 and 0.9412).
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here.
Since our key objective is to investigate the importance of urban and trade frictions, having an
idea of how well our model captures these frictions is very important. We hence assess our model’s
ability to replicate observed measures and proxies of these frictions.
Urban frictions. First, we consider urban frictions by comparing the ‘model-based’ and observed
aggregate land rents. The former can be obtained as follows:




















where we use our computed b θr and the data on the wage wr, the gross labor supply per capita hr,
and city size Lr. The observed aggregate land rent is, in turn, obtained by ALRr = GMRr/(1 −
ownersharer), where GMR is the (aggregate) gross monthly rent.23 The simple correlation between
the model-based and observed aggregate land rents across msas is 0.9805, while the Spearman rank
correlation is 0.9379. Alternatively, we can use ALRr = ERVr/(ownersharer), where ERVr is the
equivalent rent value for houses that are owned. Under this alternative formula, the correlation
between the model-based and observed aggregate land rents becomes 0.9624, while the Spearman
rank correlation is 0.9129. In all cases, the correlations are high, thus suggesting that our model
does a good job in capturing urban frictions across msas.
One might argue that our simple monocentric city model is not the most appropriate speciﬁcation
as large msas are usually polycentric. To see how urban frictions relate to polycentricity, we compute
a simple correlation between b θr and the number of employment centers in each msa for the year
23The formula can be obtained as follows. First, the total amount of expenditure in housing services (ALR) is
given by the sum of the gross monthly rent (GMR) and the equivalent rent value for houses that are owned (ERV).
Data on GMR, which can be decomposed as (average rent) × (number of houses that are rented), is available. Now
assume that GMR/(number of houses rented) = ERV/(number of houses owned) holds in each city at equilibrium
by arbitrage. Under this hypothesis, we obtain ALR = GMR/(1 − share of houses that are owned).
242000 as identiﬁed by Arribas-Bel and Sanz Gracia (2010). The correlation is −0.4282, while the
Spearman rank correlation is −0.5643, thus suggesting that our monocentric model with city-speciﬁc
commuting technology captures the tendency that larger cities are more eﬃcient for commuting as
they allow for more employment centers, thereby reducing the average commuting distance.
Trade frictions. We next assess to what extent our model can cope with the existing micro
evidence on the spatial structure of shipping patterns. To this end, we consider that the value of
sales from an establishment in city r to city s represents one shipment (characterized by an origin
msa, a destination msa, a shipping value, a unit price, and a shipping distance). We then draw a
representative sample of 40,000 establishments from all msas, which yields a total of 40,000×3562
potential shipments.24 Most of the shipments do of course not occur, and there are only 243,784
positive shipments in our sample. Figure 3, which is analogous to Figures 1–3 in Hillberry and
Hummels (2008), reports kernel regressions of various shipment characteristics on distance.25 As
one can see, both aggregate shipment values and the number of shipments fall oﬀ very quickly with
distance – becoming very small beyond a threshold of about 200 miles – whereas price per unit ﬁrst
rises with distance and average shipment values do not display a clear pattern. These results are in
line with the micro evidence from the cfs data provided by Hillberry and Hummels (2008).
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Table 3 further summarizes the observed and predicted shipping shares and shipping distances
by establishment size class. The latter are obtained as follows. First, for each establishment with















We then classify all 6,431,886 establishments in our sample by employment size class, and disaggre-
gate the value of sales for each establishment by distance shipped to compute the shares reported
in Table 3.26 The observed patterns in Table 3 come from Holmes and Stevens (2010) who use
conﬁdential cfs microdata from 1997 to compute the shares of shipping values by distance as well
as average shipping distances. As can be seen from Table 3, our model can qualitatively reproduce
the observed shipment shares, although it over- (under-) predicts the share of shipments within a
short distance for small (large) establishments while it under- (over-) predicts the share of ship-
24As in Section 4.4, the sample size is immaterial for our results provided that it is large enough. Given that the
number of shipments is substantially larger than the number of ﬁrms, drawing a large sample of 6.5 million ﬁrms as
before proves computationally infeasible.
25As in Hillberry and Hummels (2008), we use a Gaussian kernel with optimal bandwidth and calculated on 100
points. We report results for distances greater than about 10 miles (the minimum in our sample) and up to slightly
below 3,000 miles (the maximum in our sample). Note that we have less variation in distances than Hillberry and
Hummels (2008) who use either 3-digit or 5-digit zip code level data instead of msa data.
26Since we work with shares, the unobservable scaling parameter α does not aﬀect our results.
25ments within a long distance for small (large) establishments. Finally, our model can also explain
the tendency that the mean distance shipped increases with establishment size (columns 10–12).
5 Counterfactuals
Having shown that our quantiﬁed model performs well in replicating several features of the data,
we now use it for counterfactual analysis. Our aim is, in particular, to assess how the US city-size
distribution, the sizes of individual cities, as well as the distributions of productivity and markups
across msas would change if either urban frictions or trade frictions were eliminated.
5.1 Numerical procedure
We ﬁrst explain in some detail the procedure used for running counterfactuals in our framework.
In our ﬁrst counterfactual experiment (which we call ‘no urban frictions’), we set all commuting-
related frictions – and hence all land rents – to zero (b θr = 0 for all r) while keeping trade frictions
b τrs, technological possibilities b  max
r , and amenities (Ao
r and b Au
r) constant.27 This corresponds to a
hypothetical world where only goods are costly to transport while living in cities does not impose
any urban costs. In our second counterfactual experiment (which we call ‘no trade frictions’), we
set external trade costs from s to r equal to internal trade costs in r (τsr = τrr for all r and s) while
holding urban frictions b θr, technological possibilities b  max
r , and amenities (Ao
r and b Au
r) constant.
This corresponds to a hypothetical world where consumers face the same trade costs for local and
non-local varieties.28 For the sake of brevity, we explain the procedure for the case without urban
frictions only as it works analogously for the case without trade frictions.
First, we let b θr = 0 for all r and keep the initial population distribution ﬁxed. This parameter
change induces changes in the indirect utility levels. Let e U0
r denote the new counterfactual utility
in msa r, evaluated at the initial population and b θr = 0. Second, we replace b Ur with its new
counterfactual value e U0
r to obtain e D0
r = b α0+ b α1e U0
r + b α2Ao
r + b Au
r. The spatial equilibrium conditions
(54) will then, in general, no longer be satisﬁed, and hence city sizes must change. We thus consider
the following iterative adjustment procedure to ﬁnd the new counterfactual spatial equilibrium:










27Although workers are mobile in our model, we can set urban frictions to zero without having degenerate equi-
libria with full agglomeration in a single city. The reason is that, as explained before, consumers’ location choice
probabilities are expressed as a logit so that no city can completely disappear.
28We have also experimented with setting τrs = τrr for all r and s, which corresponds to a hypothetical world where
goods are as costly to trade between msas as within msas from the ﬁrms’ perspective. Although the magnitudes
delivered by this alternative counterfactual scenario are slightly larger, there are no qualitative changes.
26induced by the change in spatial frictions, which yield a new population distribution e L0
r = Le P0
r
for all r = 1,...,K.
2. Given the intial b  max
r , the new population distribution e L0
r for all r = 1,...,K, as well as the
counterfactual value for the commuting technology parameter b θr = 0, the market equilibrium
conditions (51) and (52) generate new wages e w1
r and cutoﬀs (e md
r)1. Expression (37) then yields
new utility levels e U1
r.
3. Using e D1
r = b α0 + b α1e U1
r + b α2Ao
r + b Au
r, the choice probabilities can be updated as in (57), which
yields a new population distribution e L1
r = Le P1
r for all r = 1,...,K.
4. We iterate through steps 2–3 until convergence of the population distribution to obtain {e Lr, e wr,
e md
r} for all r = 1,...,K.
5.2 No urban frictions
How would the US economic geography look like without urban frictions? In this subsection, we
focus on counterfactual changes in population, productivity, and markups. Starting with city sizes,
eliminating urban frictions leads to (gross) cross-msa population movements of about 4 million
people, i.e., 1.6% of the total msa population in our sample. These population changes are unevenly
spread across msas. New York, for example, gains about 8.5% and some msas close to New York
and Boston gain even more (New Haven-Milford, CT, gains about 12.1% and Bridgeport-Stamford-
Norwalk, CT, about 15.9%). Consistent with the comparative static results of Section 3.4, large
cities on average gain population, whereas small- and medium-sized cities tend to lose. These results
are depicted in Figure 5, which plots percentage changes in msa population against the initial log
msa population. Further insights are provided by the the top panel of Figure 6, which depicts
the distribution of counterfactual percentage changes in Lr. As there are many more small cities
that lose population than large cities that gain population, the implied distribution of percentage
changes is skewed to the left. Last, these population changes follow a rich spatial pattern, as
depicted in the top panel of Figure 7. Although individual city sizes would be substantially aﬀected
by the fall in urban frictions, the city-size distribution remains fairly stable as shown in Figure 4. A
standard rank-size rule regression reveals that the coeﬃcient on log size rises slightly from −0.9249
to −0.9178, the change being however statistically insigniﬁcant.29 We will discuss this stability in
greater depth in Section 6.3.
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here.
Turning to changes in average productivity, observe that most msas actually lose when urban
frictions are eliminated (see the middle panel of Figure 6). Indeed, as shown in Figures 6 and 7,
productivity changes can go either way. For example, Monroe, MI (a smaller msa) experiences a
29We follow Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) and adjust the rank by subtracting 1/2.
27productivity decrease of 0.9%, whereas New York sees its productivity increase by 0.76%. This is
consistent with our results from Section 3.4: as small msas lose population, local market size and,
thereby, average productivity deteriorate; in contrast, large msas and cities close by see their market
size expand, which raises productivity as trade frictions are unchanged. Interestingly, smaller cities
near New York, like Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT, and Trenton-Ewing, NJ, see their produc-
tivity increase by about 1.4% and 0.9%, respectively, which even exceeds the productivity gain in
New York itself. Computing the nation-wide productivity change, weighted by msa population
shares in the initial equilibrium, we ﬁnd that eliminating urban frictions would increase average
productivity by a mere 0.04%.
Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here.
As for markups, the bottom panels of Figures 6 and 7 reveal that this is the dimension where the
largest changes take place. Markups would decrease everywhere, with reductions ranging from 5.3%
to about 16%, but the more so for the most populated areas of the East and West coasts. As can
be seen from (36), the reason for these large changes is twofold. First, eliminating urban frictions
increases the eﬀective labor supply per capita hr = Sr/Lr everywhere, which allows for more ﬁrms
in each msa and, therefore, for more competition. Second, there is an eﬀect going through the
cutoﬀs. Some places see their cutoﬀs fall, which puts additional pressure on markups. While cutoﬀs
may increase in cities that lose population, the second eﬀect is always dominated by the ﬁrst one,
so that markups fall in all msas.
To summarize, even without urban frictions, the city-size distribution would remain fairly stable,
despite the fact that larger cities tend to grow and smaller cities tend to shrink. Furthermore, the
‘no urban frictions’ case supports more ﬁrms, which reduces markups and expands product diversity,
though ﬁrms are not on average much more productive than in a world with urban frictions. The
productivity gap between large and small cities would, however, widen.
5.3 No trade frictions
What would happen to individual city sizes, to the city-size distribution, and to productivity and
markups in a world where consumers face the same trade costs for local and non-local varieties?
To investigate this issue, we set b τsr = b τrr for all r and s.30 Starting with city sizes, eliminating
trade frictions would lead to signiﬁcant (gross) cross-msa population movements of about 10.2
million people, i.e., 4.08% of the total msa population in our sample. Some small cities would gain
substantially. For example, the population of Casper, WY, would grow by about 105% and that
of Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA, by about 99.4%. Figure 9 plots the percentage changes in msa
population against the initial log msa population. Consistent with the comparative static results of
Section 3.4, in a world without trade frictions larger cities lose ground and agents move, on average,
30Eaton and Kortum (2002) consider a similar counterfactual scenario in the context of international trade, yet
without considering induced changes in the population distribution and with a ﬁxed mass of varieties.
28to smaller cities to relax urban costs. These changes are depicted in the top panel of Figure 11.
Although individual cities would be substantially aﬀected by the fall in trade frictions, the city-size
distribution remains again quite stable, as can be seen from Figure 8. The coeﬃcient on log size
drops from −0.9249 to −0.9392, yet this change is again statistically insigniﬁcant.
Insert Figures 8 and 9 about here.
Concerning the changes in average productivity, observe ﬁrst that all msas gain. Yet, as can
be seen from the middle panels of Figures 10 and 11, the gains are unevenly spread across msas.
Whereas some small cities gain substantially (e.g., an increase of about 125.5% in Great Falls, MT),
large cities gain signiﬁcantly less: 41.18% in New York, 48.08% in Los Angeles, and 55.71% in
Chicago. The ﬁrst reason is linked to market access. Indeed, the more populated areas, e.g., those
centered around California and New England, would be those gaining the least from a reduction of
trade frictions, as they already provide ﬁrms with a good access to a large local market. The second
reason is that, as stated above, large cities tend to lose population, thereby reducing the productivity
gains brought about by the fall in trade frictions. Computing the nation-wide productivity change,
weighted by msa population shares in the initial equilibrium, we ﬁnd that eliminating trade frictions
would increase average productivity by 67.59%. Thus, reducing spatial frictions for shipping goods
would entail substantial aggregate productivity gains.
Insert Figures 10 and 11 about here.
As for markups, the bottom panels of Figures 10 and 11 reveal that they would decrease consid-
erably in a world without trade frictions, with reductions ranging from 29% to 55%. Such reductions
are particularly strong in msas with poor market access, i.e., the center of the US and the areas close
to the borders. Observe that the changes in markups – though substantial – are more compressed
than the changes in productivity (the coeﬃcient of variation for productivity changes is 0.18, while
that for changes in markups is 0.09). The reason is the following. Eliminating trade frictions re-
duces cutoﬀs in all msas, but especially in small and remote ones. This puts downward pressure
on markups. Yet, there is also an indirect eﬀect through changes in eﬀective labor supply hr. An
increase in hr, which occurs in big cities that lose population, reduces markups more strongly than
what is implied by the direct change only, while the decrease in hr that occurs in small and remote
cities gaining population works in the opposite direction and dampens the markup reductions.
To summarize, even without trade frictions, the city-size distribution would remain fairly stable,
despite the fact that larger cities tend to shrink and smaller cities tend to grow. Furthermore, the
‘no trade frictions’ case allows for higher average productivity and lower markups by intensifying
competition in all msas, and especially in small and remote ones. The productivity gap between
large and small cities would, therefore, shrink.
296 Extensions and discussion
6.1 Short- vs long-run impacts
The main insights from our two counterfactual experiments are summarized in the top panel of
Table 4. These results refer to the long-run impacts of eliminating urban or trade frictions as they
include the eﬀects of population movements. To gauge the contribution of labor mobility to these
overall impacts of spatial frictions in the US, it is useful to disentangle the short-run eﬀects, before
the population reshuﬄing has taken place, from the long-run eﬀects.
We now consider the same counterfactual experiments as in the previous section, yet we do not
allow for labor mobility and hold city sizes ﬁxed at their initial levels. The margins of adjustment
are then productivity, markups and wages. Key results are given in the middle panel of Table 4. As
one can see by comparing the short-run and the long-run ﬁgures, the bulk of changes takes place
already in the short-run.
Insert Table 4 and Figure 12 about here.
One noticeable exception is productivity changes whose sign gets reversed between the short-
and long-run in the no urban frictions case. This decomposition of the short- and long-run eﬀects
can also be related to the comparative static results of Section 3.4. There, we have shown that the
instantaneous impact of reducing urban frictions – keeping Lr ﬁxed – is to raise md
r (i.e., to lower
productivity) in the large city and to raise productivity in the small city. The quantitative ﬁndings
summarized in the top panel of Figure 12 are consistent with this prediction, as they show that the
cutoﬀs md
r rise, on average, in larger cities when urban frictions are eliminated while population is
held ﬁxed. However, as can be seen from the bottom panel of Figure 12, the subsequent movement
of population (which ﬂows toward the larger cities), more than oﬀsets this initial change, thereby
generating larger productivity gains in the bigger cities in the long-run equilibrium.31 Summing up,
whereas short-run impacts play a key role in the overall adjustments to spatial frictions, population
mobility is crucial for understanding productivity changes.
6.2 Agglomeration economies
There is a large body of literature showing that agglomeration economies, i.e., productivity gains
due to larger or denser urban areas, are a prevalent feature of the spatial economy (Rosenthal and
Strange, 2004; Melo et al., 2010). We have so far focused entirely on one channel: larger cities are
more productive because of tougher ﬁrm selection. Yet, larger or denser cities can become more
productive for various other reasons such as sharing–matching–learning externalities (Duranton and
Puga, 2004), and sorting by human capital (Combes et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2010). Although
31Some simple ols regressions of the change in md
r in the short- and in the long-run on inital population yield:
∆md
r = −0.0821∗∗∗ + 0.0127∗∗∗Lr in the short-run, and ∆md
r = 0.0817∗∗∗ − 0.0194∗∗∗Lr in the long-run, thus
showing the switch in the results depending on whether or not population is considered mobile.
30some recent studies attempt to assess the relative importance of ﬁrm selection and more conventional
agglomeration economies in explaining the productivity advantage of large cities, it is fair to say
that the issue is not settled yet (see, e.g., Combes et al., 2010; Holmes et al., 2010).
In this subsection, we illustrate a simple way to extend our framework to include agglomeration
economies. Speciﬁcally, we allow the upper bound in each msa (mmax
r ) to be a function of the
density of that msa. Agglomeration economies are thus modeled as a right-shift in the ex ante
productivity distribution: upon entry, a ﬁrm in a denser msa has a higher probability of getting a
better productivity draw.32 Starting from the baseline model, assume that technological possibilities
 max
r can be expressed as  max
r = c density
−kξ
r  ψmax
r , where densityr ≡ Lr/surfacer, ξ is the elasticity
of the ex ante upper bound of the marginal labor requirement with respect to density, and ψmax
r
is an idiosyncratic measure of technological possibilities that is purged from agglomeration eﬀects.
We can then estimate the ex ante productivity advantage of large cities by running a simple log-log
regression of b  max
r on msa population densities and a constant, which yields:
ln(b  
max





Since in the model ln max
r = k lnmmax
r plus a constant, the elasticity ξ of mmax
r with respect to
density is given by −0.1889/b k = 0.0295, which is the value we use in what follows. In words,
doubling msa density reduces the upper bound (and, equivalently, the mean by the properties of
the Pareto distribution) of the ex ante marginal labor requirement of entrants by 2.95%. That
ﬁgure, though computed for the ex ante distribution, lies within the consensus range of previous
elasticity estimates for agglomeration economies measured using ex post productivity distributions
(see Melo et al., 2010). Note that this eﬀect is independent of the subsequent truncation of the ex
post productivity distribution, thus disentangling agglomeration from selection.
We compute b  max
r in the initial equilibrium. Call it b  max,0
r . Assume now that the population of
msa r changes from L0
r to L1
r. The new b  max
r is then given by b  max,1
r = c   (L1
r/surfacer)−kξ   b ψmax
r .
Hence, it is easy to see that, given the initial estimates b  max,0
r we have b  max,1





Thus, we can integrate agglomeration economies in a straightforward way into our framework by
replacing b  max
r by b  max
r (Lr/L0
r)






















































We run both counterfactuals (‘no urban frictions’ and ‘no trade frictions’) with the agglomeration
economies speciﬁcation. The long-run impacts are summarized in the bottom panel of Table 4
32Formally, the right-shift in the ex ante productivity distribution implies that the distribution in a denser msa
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that in a less dense msa. Observe that ﬁrm selection afterwards acts as a
truncation, so that the ex post distribution is both right-shifted and truncated.
31(labeled cf3 and cf4, respectively). As can be seen, results change little compared to our previous
speciﬁcation without agglomeration economies (reported in the top panel). If anything, the implied
aggregate changes become a bit larger, but the overall diﬀerence is small. Observe that this ﬁnding
does not mean that agglomeration economies are unimportant. The reason why they do not matter
much in our counterfactuals is that not that many people move between the initial and the coun-
terfactual equilibria. Yet, given the measured elasticities of agglomeration economies, substantial
population movements would be required for them to become quantitatively really important.
6.3 How important are spatial frictions?
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to investigate the impact of both urban and
trade frictions on the size distribution of cities.33 A key novel insight of our analysis is that spatial
frictions have a quite limited impact on that distribution. Although there would be small changes in
the coeﬃcient on log size, the rank-size rule would still hold with a statistically identical coeﬃcient
in a world without urban or trade frictions (both with and without the prevalence of agglomeration
economies).34 This result has important implications for future spatial modeling. As far as the
city-size distribution is concerned, we can apparently abstract from either urban or trade frictions
without much loss of generality. Hence, the modeling strategies taken by recent studies such as
Gabaix (1999), Eeckhout (2004), Duranton (2007) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), where
trade frictions are assumed away, indeed appear to be good approximations.
Although spatial frictions hardly aﬀect the city-size distribution, they do matter for the sizes
of individual cities within that stable distribution. Indeed, eliminating spatial frictions leads to
aggregate (gross) inter-msa reallocations of about 4–10 million people. Whether or not large or small
cities gain population crucially depends on which type of spatial frictions is eliminated. Actually,
our numbers for the aggregate population movements might appear quite small at ﬁrst glance, given
that we contemplate major exogenous shocks in our counterfactual exercises. Yet, one has to keep
in mind that we have considered simultaneous reductions in spatial frictions for all cities. We can
33The most closely related paper in that respect is Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010). Their framework, however,
abstracts from trade frictions, so that it is not suited to investigate their impact on the city-size distribution. Our
result on urban frictions also contrasts with that of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2010), who ﬁnd that the size
distribution tilts substantially when urban frictions are reduced. The diﬀerence in results can be understood as
follows. In their analysis, the commuting friction parameter is common to all msas, whereas it is city speciﬁc in
our model. In our setting, big cities like New York or Los Angeles tend to have the best commuting technologies in
the initial equilibrium, so that the impacts of setting b θr = 0 are relatively small there. By contrast, in Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (2010), the commuting technology improves equally across all msas so that big cities get very large
due to larger eﬃciency gains in commuting than in our case. Another key diﬀerence is that in Desmet and Rossi-
Hansberg (2010), all consumers react in the same way to changes in utility and amenities, whereas those reactions
are idiosyncratic in our model and, therefore, less extreme.
34This insight is also consistent with the relative stability of the US city-size distribution over the 20th century as
documented by Black and Henderson (2003). Note that although urban and trade frictions changed a lot over that
century, such aspects are not explicitly incorporated into their stochastic modeling framework.
32also look at a unilateral reduction for a single city only. Speciﬁcally, let us brieﬂy consider two
additional counterfactuals. In the ﬁrst one, we only change, with respect to the initial equilibrium,
urban costs for New York where they fall to zero. In that case, New York grows by about 19.73%
(i.e., by about 3.7 million people) in the speciﬁcation without, and by 20.61% in the speciﬁcation
with agglomeration economies. In the second one, we set τsr = τrr for all s only when r is New York.
That is, we improve the market access to New York for all ﬁrms that are located elsewhere, while
holding the market access of ﬁrms located in New York to other msas constant. In that case, New
York shrinks by a remarkable 15.57% (i.e., about 3 million people), and if we additionally allow for
agglomeration economies it even shrinks by 15.95%. Hence, a unilateral change in spatial frictions
for a single city has a much larger impact on the size of that city. More generally, these results show
that the relative levels across cities of both types of frictions matter a lot to understand the sizes
of individual cities.
Finally, our experiments show that urban and trade frictions matter, though to a diﬀerent
extent, for the distributions of productivity and markups – and ultimately welfare – across msas.
Eliminating trade frictions would lead to signiﬁcant productivity gains and substantially reduced
markups. These changes are highly heterogeneous across space and tend to reduce diﬀerences in
productivity and city sizes across msas. Concerning urban frictions, their elimination would not
give rise to such signiﬁcant productivity gains, but would still considerably intensify competition
and generate lower markups.
7 Conclusions
We have developed a new neg-cum-‘urban systems’ model and analyzed how city sizes, on the one
hand, and productivity and competition, on the other hand, simultaneously respond to shocks in
spatial frictions. Using 2007 US data at the state and at the metropolitan statistical area (msa)
levels, we have quantiﬁed our model using all of its market and spatial equilibrium conditions, a
gravity equation for trade ﬂows, and a logit model for consumers’ location choice probabilities. The
quantiﬁed model performs well empirically and is able to reproduce – both at the msa and the ﬁrm
levels – a number of empirical features that are linked to urban and trade frictions
To assess the importance of spatial frictions, we have used our model to study two counterfactual
scenarios. Those allow us to trace out the impacts of both trade and urban frictions on the city-size
distribution, the sizes of individual cities, as well as on productivity and competition across space.
A ﬁrst key insight is that the spatial distribution of population is little sensitive to the presence of
either trade or urban frictions. A second key insight is that, within the stable distribution, the sizes
of individual cities can be aﬀected substantially by changes in spatial frictions. Last, our third key
insight is that, depending on the type of spatial frictions we consider, their presence imposes quite
signiﬁcant welfare costs in terms of foregone productivity, reduced product diversity, and too high
price-cost margins.
33We believe that our framework provides a useful starting point for further general equilibrium
counterfactual analysis in spatial models. In particular, our model: (i) endogenizes productivity,
markups, and product diversity at the ﬁrm level, three aspects that loom large in the recent trade
literature; (ii) encompasses many key elements identiﬁed as being relevant by the neg and urban
economics literature;; (iii) allows to deal with heterogeneity along several dimensions (across space,
across ﬁrms, across consumers); (iv) can be readily brought to data in very a self-contained way; (v)
ﬁts quite nicely features of the data not used in the quantiﬁcation stage, including spatial shipping
patterns and aggregate land rents; and (vi) provides a more spatially oriented approach to the
classical Rosen-Roback type of analysis widely used in the urban economics literature.
There are many additional relevant questions that could be investigated within our framework,
and we here suggest two of them. First, our model delivers a msa-speciﬁc measure of underlying
productivity, our technological possibilities b  max
r . This measure is, by construction, ﬁltered for ag-
glomeration eﬀects that stem from either local market size or accessibility. The correlation with an
observed measure of productivity, such as gdp per employee (md
r), is far from perfect (0.6512) thus
providing substantial additional information on the determinants of an msa’s productivity. Ana-
lyzing the economic fundamentals behind the spatial and temporal variation in the b  max
r certainly
represents an interesting avenue of further research. Second, it would be desirable to replicate our
results for countries other than the US. The features of the spatial distribution of economic activity
in the European Union are, for example, quite diﬀerent from those of the US.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoﬀ md. To see that there exists a unique










where the sign comes from W′ > 0 and W−2 ≥ 1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ md. Hence, the left-hand side of (14) is







W−1 + W − 2
￿






W−1 + W − 2
￿
dG(m) = ∞.
A.2. Indirect utility in the single city. To derive the indirect utility, we ﬁrst compute the
(unweighted) average price across all varieties. Multiplying both sides of (10) by p(i), integrating over Ω,
and using (7), we obtain:
p = mw +
αE
N
where m ≡ (1/N)
R
Ω m(j)dj denotes the average marginal labor requirement of the surviving ﬁrms. Using









where we use E = (S/L)w, pd = mdw and m = [k/(k + 1)]md. When combined with (18) and (19), we
obtain the expression for U as given in (20).
We now show that U is single-peaked with respect to L. To this end, we rewrite the indirect utility
(21) as U = b(S/L)L1/(k+1), where b is a positive constant capturing k, α, and µmax, and then consider a























cuts the horizontal line k/(k+1) ∈ (0,1) only once from above. Notice that LS′/S → 1 as L → 0, whereas





























i2 < 0, ∀L.
38For this to be the case, the numerator must be positive. Let y ≡ θ
p
L/π > 0. Then we can show that
H(y) ≡ 2 + y + ey(y − 2) > 0 for all y > 0. Obviously, H(0) = 0. So, if H′ > 0 for all y > 0, the proof is
complete. It is readily veriﬁed that H′ = 1 + yey − ey > 0 is equivalent to e−y > 1 − y, which is true for
all y by convexity of e−y (observe that 1 − y is the tangent to e−y at y = 0 and that a convex function is
everywhere above its tangent).
A.3. The mass of varieties consumed in the urban system. Using Nc
r as deﬁned in (28),







































Using the deﬁnition of µmax
s , and noting that the summation in the foregoing expression appears in the
equilibrium relationship (34), we can then express the mass of varieties consumed in city r as given in (35).
A.4. The weighted average of markups in the urban system. Plugging (29) into the deﬁnition



















where the argument em/mx
sr of the Lambert W function is suppressed to alleviate notation. As shown in




sr. Using this, together
with (27) and Er = (Sr/Lr)wr, yields the expression in (36).
A.5. Indirect utility in the urban system. To derive the indirect utility, we ﬁrst compute the
(unweighted) average price across all varieties sold in each market. Multiplying both sides of (26) by prs(i),






























0 mdGs(m) = [k/(k + 1)]mx
srNE
s Gs(mx
sr). Hence, the (unweighted) average price can be rewritten






























where we have used (28) and pd
r = τsrwsmx













which together with (35) and (36) yields (37).
39A.6. Some analytical results in the two-city case.
(i) A reduction in θ from any given positive value to zero raises S1/S2. In a world with urban frictions























In a world without urban frictions (where θ = 0), we have e S1 = L1h and e S2 = L2h, so that e S1/e S2 =
L1/L2. Our aim is thus to prove that L1/L2 is larger than the term S1/S2 given in (62). Letting
yr ≡ θ
p
Lr/π > 0, this is equivalent to proving that y2
1/(1 − e−y1 − y1e−y1) > y2
2/(1 − e−y2 − y2e−y2).
We thus need to show that y2/(1 − e−y − ye−y) is increasing because y1 > y2. By diﬀerentiating, we have
the derivative
ye−y
(1 − e−y − ye−y)
2Y, where Y ≡ 2ey − [(y + 1)2 + 1].
Noting that Y = 0 at y = 0 and Y ′ = 2[ey − (y + 1)] > 0 for all y > 0, we know that the derivative is
positive for all y > 0. Hence, e S1/e S2 = L1/L2 > S1/S2.
(ii) e md
1 < md
1 and e md
2 < md
2 in the case without trade frictions. Setting τ = t, the market equilibrium





















where X1 ≡ (md
1)k+1, X2 ≡ (md







t = L1ΩX1 + L2X2. Hence, Ω = ρ must hold when τ = t. We know by (65) that
X2 = (σ/ρ)Ω
2k+1
k+1 X1 = σρ
k
k+1X1. Plugging this expression into (63) yields the counterfactual cutoﬀs




























































































ωk+1 − ρ(t/τ)k = ωk,
40where the last equality holds by (44). We thus need to prove ρk/(k+1)(τ/t)k > ωk or ρ1/(k+1)(τ/t) > ω,
which is straightforward since ρ1/(k+1)(τ/t) > ρ1/(k+1)(τ/t)k/(k+1) ≡ ω > ω. Hence, e md
1 < md
1 must be
true. Using a similar approach, it can be shown that e md
2 < md
2 is also satisﬁed. The elimination of trade
frictions thus leads to lower cutoﬀs in both cities.
(iii) e Υ < Υ for ρ1/(k+1) ≤ σ. Let ∆md
r ≡ md
r − e md


































(66), the counterfactual cutoﬀ ratio is given by (e md
2/e md
1)k+1 = σρk/(k+1), whereas using (43), the cutoﬀ































1 boils down to showing that ρ1/(k+1) < ω at the market equilibrium. This can be
done by evaluating (44) at ω = ρ1/(k+1). The LHS is equal to ρk/(k+1), which falls short of the RHS given
by ρS1/S2 (because ρ ≥ 1, k ≥ 1, and S1/S2 > 1). Since the LHS is increasing and the RHS is decreasing,




1 . Turning to the second step, this




























































> 1. A suﬃcient condi-
tion for this to be satisﬁed, given (68), is that (e md
2/e md
1)(h1/h2) ≤ 1, i.e., that [σρk/(k+1)]1/(k+1)(1/σ) =
[ρ1/(k+1)/σ]k/(k+1) ≤ 1. This is the case if ρ1/(k+1) ≤ σ.
Appendix B: Integrals involving the Lambert W function
To derive closed-form solutions for various expressions throughout the paper we need to compute integrals
involving the Lambert W function. This can be done by using the change in variables suggested by Corless







, so that e
m
I
= zez, where I = md
r,mx
rs,
where subscript r can be dropped in the closed economy. The change in variables then yields dm =
(1 + z)ez−1Idz, with the new integration bounds given by 0 and 1. Under our assumption of a Pareto
distribution for productivity draws, the change in variables allows to rewrite integrals in simpliﬁed form.











dGr(m) = κ1 (mmax
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ1 ≡ ke−(k+1) R 1
0 (1 − z2)(zez)
k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the shape
parameter k.



















dGr(m) = κ2 (mmax
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ2 ≡ ke−(k+1) R 1
0 (1 + z)
￿
z−1 + z − 2
￿
(zez)
k ezdz > 0 is also a constant term which solely depends
on the shape parameter k.

















dGr(m) = κ3 (mmax
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ3 ≡ ke−(k+1) R 1
0 (z−2 − z−1)(1 + z)(zez)kezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the
shape parameter k.













dGr(m) = κ4 (mmax
r )
−k Ik+1,
where κ4 ≡ ke−(1+k) R 1
0 (z−1 − z)(zez)
k ezdz > 0 is a constant term which solely depends on the shape
parameter k. Using the expressions for κ1 and κ2, one can verify that κ4 = κ1 + κ2.
Appendix C: Equilibrium conditions in the urban system
using the Lambert W function







[prs(m) − τrsmwr]qrs(m)dGr(m) = Fwr. (69)































42We now restate the foregoing conditions (69)–(71) in terms of the Lambert W function.



















































dGr(m) = F. (73)









































Applying the city-speciﬁc Pareto distribution Gr(m) = (m/mmax
r )
k to (72)–(74) yields, using the results
of Appendix B, expressions (30)–(32) given in the main text.
Appendix D: Data description
msa-level data. We construct a dataset for 356 metropolitan statistical areas (see Table 1 for a full
list of the msas). The bulk of our msa-level data comes from the 2007 American Community Survey
(acs) of the US Census, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (bea) and from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (bls). The geographical coordinates of each msa are computed as the centroid of its constituent
counties’ geographical coordinates. The latter are obtained from the 2000 US Census Gazetteer county
geography ﬁle, and the msa-level aggregation is carried out using the county-to-msa concordance tables




×6,378.137 using the great circle formula, where latr and lonr are the
geographical coordinates of the msa. The internal distance of an msa is deﬁned as drr ≡ (2/3)
p
surfacer/π
as in Redding and Venables (2004). All msa surface measures are given in square kilometers and include
only land surface of the msa’s constitutent counties. That data is obtained from the 2000 US Census
Gazetteer, and is aggregated from the county to the msa level.
We further obtain total gross domestic product by msa from the bea metropolitan GDP ﬁles. Total
employment at the msa level is obtained from the 2007 bls employment ﬂat ﬁles (we use aggregate values
for ‘All occupations’). Using gross domestic product, total employment, and the average number of hours
worked allows us to recover our measure of average msa productivity (GDP per employee). Wages at
the msa level for 2007 are computed as total labor expenses (compensation of employees plus employer
contributions for employee pension and insurance funds plus employer contributions for government social
insurance) divided by total msa employment. Data to compute total labor expenses is provided by the bea.
Last, county-level data on natural amenities are from 1999 and provided by the US Department of
Agriculture (usda). The usda data includes six measures of climate, topography, and water area that
43reﬂect environmental attributes usually valued by people. We use the standardized amenity score from
that data as a proxy for our observed amenities. We aggregate the county-level amenities up to the msa
level by using the county-to-msa concordance table and by weighting each county by its share in the total
msa land surface.
Urban frictions data. Total msa population is taken from the 2007 acs. The 2007 acs further
provides msa-level data on average weekly hours worked and on average (one-way) commuting time in
minutes. Both pieces of information are used to compute the internal cutoﬀs md
r, the aggregate labor
supply hrLr, and the eﬀective labor supply Sr.
Trade frictions data. We estimate a gravity equation on state-to-state trade ﬂows to obtain an
estimate of the distance elasticity γ. To this end, we use aggregate bilateral trade ﬂows Xrs from the 2007
Commodity Flow Survey (cfs) of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (bts) for the lower 48 contiguous
US states, as these are the states containing the msas that will be used in our analysis. We work at the
state level since msa trade ﬂows from the cfs public ﬁles can only be meaningfully exploited for a relatively
small sample of large ‘cfs regions’. Duranton et al. (2011, p.10), for example, work with that data to
estimate the distance elasticity of trade ﬂows. We ran several robustness checks using their estimate of
γ instead of ours. Results are little sensitive to that choice. As to the speciﬁcation of trade costs τrs we
stick to standard practice and assume that τrs ≡ d
γ
rs, where drs stands for the distance between r and s
in kilometers computed using the great circle formula given above.35 In that case, latr and lonr denote
the coordinates of the capital of state r, measured in radians, which are taken from Anderson and van
Wincoop’s (2003) dataset.
35Using cfs trade data, Duranton et al. (2011) show that the distance elasticity of trade within the US is basically
insensitive to how distance is exactly measured (euclidian distance vs. various distance measures based on current
or historical highway grids).
44Table 1: msa variables and descriptives for the initial equilibrium
fips msa name State Lr/L b µmax
r 1/mr b θr Ao
r b Au
r
10180 Abilene TX 0.2268 6.8852 0.8328 0.3925 1.3141 -0.6556
10420 Akron OH 0.9956 17.4352 0.8212 0.2473 -2.2749 1.0062
10500 Albany GA 0.2336 28.3000 0.7182 0.4608 -0.0435 -0.4451
10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy NY 1.2149 15.6558 0.8722 0.2015 -0.2432 1.1317
10740 Albuquerque NM 1.1889 11.6475 0.8694 0.2232 3.7322 0.9275
10780 Alexandria LA 0.2133 14.7747 0.7632 0.5445 -0.2067 -0.5842
10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton PA-NJ 1.1444 22.9469 0.8678 0.3088 0.3026 0.9760
11020 Altoona PA 0.1787 28.9660 0.6877 0.5223 -0.8600 -0.7009
11100 Amarillo TX 0.3449 7.1209 0.8305 0.3277 1.6304 -0.2289
11180 Ames IA 0.1207 0.7978 0.9817 0.6556 -3.5400 -1.1175
11300 Anderson IN 0.1869 6.1621 0.8247 0.8718 -3.4700 -0.6463
11340 Anderson SC 0.2562 16.3593 0.7543 0.5571 0.7100 -0.4872
11460 Ann Arbor MI 0.4983 2.9986 0.9738 0.2977 -2.1900 0.1721
11500 Anniston-Oxford AL 0.1610 13.1516 0.7430 0.5613 0.2200 -0.9536
11540 Appleton WI 0.3104 9.1579 0.7999 0.3684 -2.7304 -0.0904
11700 Asheville NC 0.5756 31.3698 0.7609 0.3163 2.1012 0.2978
12020 Athens-Clarke County GA 0.2668 15.4460 0.7858 0.4865 -1.0511 -0.3069
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta GA 7.5152 7.9312 1.0828 0.1174 0.2253 2.7880
12100 Atlantic City-Hammonton NJ 0.3853 4.3460 0.9247 0.3301 -0.0400 -0.2364
12220 Auburn-Opelika AL 0.1858 14.1079 0.7298 0.6358 -0.2400 -0.7240
12260 Augusta-Richmond County GA-SC 0.7524 23.6409 0.8053 0.2920 -0.0192 0.6829
12420 Austin-Round Rock TX 2.2752 5.6156 0.9979 0.1860 1.6141 1.5231
12540 Bakersﬁeld CA 1.1257 8.3291 0.9841 0.2453 4.8400 0.6741
12580 Baltimore-Towson MD 3.7983 12.0935 0.9856 0.1519 -0.3557 2.1378
12620 Bangor ME 0.2118 5.6207 0.8107 0.5506 -0.5200 -0.5302
12700 Barnstable Town MA 0.3163 2.9345 0.8556 0.4759 1.5200 -0.4993
12940 Baton Rouge LA 1.0962 3.7242 1.0012 0.2569 -0.6186 0.9311
12980 Battle Creek MI 0.1945 7.2642 0.8301 0.4982 -2.7300 -0.6453
13020 Bay City MI 0.1531 6.5755 0.7780 0.7995 -1.5300 -0.9167
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur TX 0.5356 8.3601 0.8672 0.2801 0.9407 0.1728
13380 Bellingham WA 0.2748 1.1589 0.9747 0.4955 5.2600 -0.7955
13460 Bend OR 0.2193 2.3869 0.8996 0.4620 6.1000 -1.0336
13740 Billings MT 0.2131 7.1640 0.7761 0.3735 2.4532 -0.6830
13780 Binghamton NY 0.3508 56.9535 0.6866 0.3785 -0.9289 0.0588
13820 Birmingham-Hoover AL 1.5777 5.8973 1.0014 0.2055 0.5780 1.2351
13900 Bismarck ND 0.1470 12.2467 0.7085 0.4403 -1.6258 -0.7564
13980 Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford VA 0.2244 10.1677 0.8144 0.5208 0.5141 -0.5979
14020 Bloomington IN 0.2616 14.7889 0.8140 0.5467 -0.4507 -0.3408
14060 Bloomington-Normal IL 0.2338 2.4247 0.9891 0.3871 -3.5700 -0.4375
14260 Boise City-Nampa ID 0.8367 10.6193 0.8491 0.2399 2.2919 0.6976
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MA-NH 6.3819 2.7007 1.1870 0.1098 0.1444 2.4955
14500 Boulder CO 0.4132 0.6188 1.1168 0.3373 5.8200 -0.6755
14540 Bowling Green KY 0.1651 12.3177 0.7702 0.5611 -0.2160 -0.8510
14740 Bremerton-Silverdale WA 0.3370 1.2068 1.0491 0.7249 2.6100 -0.6981
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk CT 1.2742 0.0329 1.8325 0.2506 2.2500 -0.2081
15180 Brownsville-Harlingen TX 0.5512 55.3719 0.5912 0.3178 2.4600 0.3482
15260 Brunswick GA 0.1449 13.3594 0.7523 0.6313 1.3530 -1.0593
15380 Buﬀalo-Niagara Falls NY 1.6061 15.4178 0.8225 0.1730 -0.6399 1.4505
15500 Burlington NC 0.2069 16.5166 0.7377 0.6324 -0.9600 -0.6176
15540 Burlington-South Burlington VT 0.2952 2.2778 0.9027 0.4271 -0.1238 -0.3845
15940 Canton-Massillon OH 0.5797 27.4059 0.7541 0.3382 -1.4796 0.4955
15980 Cape Coral-Fort Myers FL 0.8407 2.0378 0.9635 0.3210 5.2300 0.1676
16220 Casper WY 0.1021 0.0797 1.3629 0.4917 2.4900 -1.9697
16300 Cedar Rapids IA 0.3599 6.3374 0.8708 0.3126 -3.3035 0.0590
16580 Champaign-Urbana IL 0.3145 14.7922 0.8363 0.3848 -4.3383 0.0884
16620 Charleston WV 0.4327 6.2623 0.9251 0.3322 -0.7294 0.0286
16700 Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville SC 0.8970 8.8536 0.8690 0.2777 0.5686 0.7409
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord NC-SC 2.3512 0.6377 1.3186 0.1561 0.1000 1.3196
16820 Charlottesville VA 0.2744 7.2636 0.9001 0.4341 -0.0364 -0.4526
16860 Chattanooga TN-GA 0.7326 8.8814 0.8897 0.2830 0.2832 0.5342
16940 Cheyenne WY 0.1229 2.1311 0.9176 0.5112 3.0500 -1.4960
16980 Chicago-Naperville-Joliet IL-IN-WI 13.5596 7.6522 1.1400 0.0867 -2.1021 3.4958
17020 Chico CA 0.3115 5.1269 0.8541 0.5341 5.1100 -0.5608
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown OH-KY-IN 3.0376 14.2620 0.9455 0.1438 -0.7916 2.0448
17300 Clarksville TN-KY 0.3727 1.4179 1.0663 0.5319 0.0733 -0.3729
17420 Cleveland TN 0.1582 3.0055 0.9115 0.7279 0.8781 -1.1302
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor OH 2.9846 7.3233 0.9836 0.1352 -1.4310 1.9676
17660 Coeur d’Alene ID 0.1914 8.3418 0.7161 0.6066 3.5000 -0.9011
17780 College Station-Bryan TX 0.2895 47.5407 0.7123 0.4095 0.8622 -0.2296
17820 Colorado Springs CO 0.8671 7.0613 0.8860 0.2838 5.3867 0.3780
17860 Columbia MO 0.2311 16.7125 0.7364 0.4196 0.1054 -0.4706
17900 Columbia SC 1.0194 22.2288 0.8323 0.2385 0.5017 0.9371
17980 Columbus GA-AL 0.4025 8.7851 0.8541 0.3100 -0.2353 -0.0490
18020 Columbus IN 0.1064 2.9595 0.8788 0.4856 -2.3800 -1.3775
18140 Columbus OH 2.4975 11.5892 0.9535 0.1398 -1.9162 1.8984
18580 Corpus Christi TX 0.5899 5.0627 0.8543 0.2746 2.8551 0.1577
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18700 Corvallis OR 0.1159 0.1014 1.2152 0.7211 3.1000 -1.8133
19060 Cumberland MD-WV 0.1414 56.7425 0.6576 0.7389 1.0076 -0.9889
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington TX 8.7483 3.2987 1.2029 0.0923 0.6857 2.8079
19140 Dalton GA 0.1908 15.8567 0.7386 0.3339 0.4652 -0.8035
19180 Danville IL 0.1156 13.3585 0.7769 0.7748 -3.2100 -1.0515
19260 Danville VA 0.1506 34.1566 0.7025 0.6804 -0.3000 -0.8908
19340 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island IA-IL 0.5355 8.2798 0.8791 0.2759 -2.6893 0.4377
19380 Dayton OH 1.1895 14.1872 0.8640 0.1988 -2.1260 1.1962
19460 Decatur AL 0.2125 3.5335 0.9214 0.6612 0.7910 -0.8247
19500 Decatur IL 0.1548 2.7975 0.8839 0.4092 -2.7900 -0.9344
19660 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach FL 0.7124 22.2777 0.7462 0.3743 3.4500 0.3884
19740 Denver-Aurora CO 3.4326 2.2957 1.1516 0.1477 4.1942 1.7018
19780 Des Moines-West Des Moines IA 0.7782 2.2274 1.0158 0.2050 -2.0346 0.6429
19820 Detroit-Warren-Livonia MI 6.3602 8.3299 1.0380 0.1089 -1.6704 2.7501
20020 Dothan AL 0.1986 49.5100 0.6561 0.4212 -0.4149 -0.5370
20100 Dover DE 0.2168 1.9540 1.0020 0.5895 -0.0700 -0.8842
20220 Dubuque IA 0.1315 5.7814 0.7869 0.3977 -0.7900 -1.1171
20260 Duluth MN-WI 0.3905 18.6402 0.7996 0.3678 -0.8127 0.1938
20500 Durham NC 0.6828 0.8200 1.1939 0.2552 0.0966 0.1845
20740 Eau Claire WI 0.2247 12.7566 0.7611 0.4796 -2.6695 -0.3365
20940 El Centro CA 0.2304 19.7182 0.7872 0.4081 6.4500 -0.8598
21060 Elizabethtown KY 0.1589 3.7636 0.8891 0.5914 -0.8465 -1.0560
21140 Elkhart-Goshen IN 0.2818 9.4337 0.7923 0.2901 -2.7200 -0.2450
21300 Elmira NY 0.1253 16.7836 0.7000 0.6243 -1.1300 -1.0690
21340 El Paso TX 1.0459 2.2083 0.9271 0.2441 4.4600 0.5021
21500 Erie PA 0.3973 18.7253 0.7395 0.3204 -0.5700 0.0764
21660 Eugene-Springﬁeld OR 0.4891 13.2218 0.7821 0.3197 4.2900 0.0543
21780 Evansville IN-KY 0.4979 8.0962 0.8860 0.2898 -1.6375 0.2844
22020 Fargo ND-MN 0.2739 4.1400 0.8364 0.3067 -4.5908 -0.0388
22140 Farmington NM 0.1743 0.2874 1.2203 0.5778 2.8300 -1.3307
22180 Fayetteville NC 0.4968 0.7242 1.1132 0.3601 -0.9161 -0.1293
22220 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers AR-MO 0.6203 13.9314 0.8230 0.2715 0.8552 0.4160
22380 Flagstaﬀ AZ 0.1814 41.4362 0.7797 0.4704 4.9300 -0.8937
22420 Flint MI 0.6189 11.2936 0.8235 0.4086 -1.9000 0.4963
22500 Florence SC 0.2829 14.4850 0.7801 0.4358 -0.2137 -0.3219
22520 Florence-Muscle Shoals AL 0.2038 22.0682 0.7281 0.6420 0.8059 -0.6681
22540 Fond du Lac WI 0.1411 5.1570 0.8386 0.6231 -1.9200 -1.0104
22660 Fort Collins-Loveland CO 0.4094 9.8391 0.8295 0.3890 5.6200 -0.3039
22900 Fort Smith AR-OK 0.4124 21.2879 0.7892 0.3342 1.6228 -0.0124
23020 Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin FL 0.2584 0.3985 1.1155 0.4967 2.0100 -0.9455
23060 Fort Wayne IN 0.5838 20.3049 0.7882 0.2692 -3.0754 0.5929
23420 Fresno CA 1.2803 22.9506 0.8468 0.2171 6.0300 0.8406
23460 Gadsden AL 0.1469 27.7629 0.6669 0.7121 0.9600 -1.0397
23540 Gainesville FL 0.3660 7.8664 0.8210 0.3731 2.0892 -0.2095
23580 Gainesville GA 0.2565 4.7162 0.8383 0.6287 0.9600 -0.6703
24020 Glens Falls NY 0.1835 53.2073 0.6769 0.6495 -0.3136 -0.6305
24140 Goldsboro NC 0.1617 4.7743 0.8234 0.6350 -1.4100 -0.9470
24220 Grand Forks ND-MN 0.1391 7.5933 0.7678 0.4540 -4.2873 -0.6426
24300 Grand Junction CO 0.1980 14.4225 0.7324 0.5205 2.2600 -0.7599
24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming MI 1.1058 14.8202 0.8746 0.2091 -2.1226 1.1623
24500 Great Falls MT 0.1164 3.0799 0.7954 0.5633 2.2000 -1.3183
24540 Greeley CO 0.3470 11.1165 0.8543 0.6195 1.7000 -0.2422
24580 Green Bay WI 0.4287 7.7067 0.8387 0.2912 -1.3945 0.1489
24660 Greensboro-High Point NC 0.9944 12.2863 0.8764 0.2038 -0.2512 0.8794
24780 Greenville NC 0.2455 8.4053 0.8048 0.4570 -1.9108 -0.3848
24860 Greenville-Mauldin-Easley SC 0.8739 29.0690 0.7805 0.2293 1.3467 0.7392
25060 Gulfport-Biloxi MS 0.3296 3.7705 0.8944 0.4062 0.1310 -0.3076
25180 Hagerstown-Martinsburg MD-WV 0.3718 29.3045 0.7547 0.6204 0.3042 -0.0839
25260 Hanford-Corcoran CA 0.2119 4.4956 0.8817 0.5882 3.4800 -0.9992
25420 Harrisburg-Carlisle PA 0.7529 15.7008 0.8614 0.2220 -0.0004 0.5819
25500 Harrisonburg VA 0.1674 3.5773 0.9210 0.4938 1.2500 -1.0739
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford CT 1.6929 0.6312 1.3157 0.1934 1.4760 0.8809
25620 Hattiesburg MS 0.1967 14.5668 0.7576 0.6026 -0.2014 -0.6437
25860 Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton NC 0.5132 43.2249 0.7227 0.3150 1.5055 0.2302
25980 Hinesville-Fort Stewart GA 0.1022 0.0097 1.7152 1.4824 0.8063 -2.4818
26100 Holland-Grand Haven MI 0.3690 4.6934 0.8693 0.4246 -0.0400 -0.1742
26300 Hot Springs AR 0.1372 11.9767 0.7219 0.7581 1.6400 -1.1335
26380 Houma-Bayou Cane-Thibodaux LA 0.2863 2.3685 0.9718 0.4086 0.3192 -0.5579
26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown TX 8.0123 0.7875 1.4273 0.1036 0.8426 2.4951
26580 Huntington-Ashland WV-KY-OH 0.4043 18.9859 0.7879 0.3638 -0.1699 0.0365
26620 Huntsville AL 0.5504 4.8277 0.9105 0.2864 -0.9066 0.2760
26820 Idaho Falls ID 0.1700 14.9270 0.6994 0.6242 1.7783 -0.8152
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel IN 2.4131 6.4117 1.0203 0.1453 -2.5367 1.8239
26980 Iowa City IA 0.2093 3.0028 0.9098 0.4185 -2.9476 -0.5311
27060 Ithaca NY 0.1439 7.6229 0.7882 0.5491 -0.2800 -0.9925
27100 Jackson MI 0.2321 5.6531 0.8683 0.6124 -2.4500 -0.4931
27140 Jackson MS 0.7603 9.3264 0.8735 0.2701 -0.6024 0.6792
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27180 Jackson TN 0.1604 8.0248 0.7820 0.4913 -1.6345 -0.8225
27260 Jacksonville FL 1.8519 6.0828 0.9489 0.1930 2.0244 1.3020
27340 Jacksonville NC 0.2317 0.1526 1.2201 0.6158 0.7400 -1.3510
27500 Janesville WI 0.2272 17.1165 0.7514 0.5567 -2.6200 -0.3910
27620 Jeﬀerson City MO 0.2074 21.2752 0.7585 0.4518 0.3296 -0.5943
27740 Johnson City TN 0.2755 15.4626 0.7613 0.4448 1.5055 -0.4559
27780 Johnstown PA 0.2064 47.5556 0.6679 0.5599 -0.2300 -0.5483
27860 Jonesboro AR 0.1657 19.0537 0.7332 0.4910 -2.2503 -0.6718
27900 Joplin MO 0.2438 33.7469 0.6737 0.4025 -1.3200 -0.2872
28020 Kalamazoo-Portage MI 0.4602 10.9030 0.8445 0.3422 -1.3239 0.2034
28100 Kankakee-Bradley IL 0.1576 66.9572 0.6773 0.7130 -3.3000 -0.6326
28140 Kansas City MO-KS 2.8265 9.2978 0.9719 0.1388 -1.3222 2.0201
28420 Kennewick-Pasco-Richland WA 0.3260 1.7999 0.9386 0.4454 0.7491 -0.3261
28660 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood TX 0.5268 2.1655 1.0220 0.3488 1.5578 -0.0822
28700 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol TN-VA 0.4323 20.7011 0.7895 0.3835 0.3622 0.0800
28740 Kingston NY 0.2589 38.4944 0.7621 0.7757 0.7000 -0.4394
28940 Knoxville TN 0.9702 10.7076 0.8633 0.2284 1.0960 0.7774
29020 Kokomo IN 0.1421 4.4454 0.8611 0.4794 -4.4522 -0.9032
29100 La Crosse WI-MN 0.1864 15.4794 0.7197 0.4276 -1.1484 -0.6119
29140 Lafayette IN 0.2736 6.6786 0.8963 0.4269 -3.4119 -0.2047
29180 Lafayette LA 0.3652 0.3936 1.1340 0.3333 -0.9092 -0.4845
29340 Lake Charles LA 0.2732 0.2160 1.2988 0.4158 0.1230 -0.8452
29460 Lakeland-Winter Haven FL 0.8182 41.3451 0.7338 0.3320 3.9800 0.5254
29540 Lancaster PA 0.7096 23.6630 0.8138 0.2773 0.4500 0.4974
29620 Lansing-East Lansing MI 0.6498 8.5097 0.9034 0.3102 -3.3358 0.6664
29700 Laredo TX 0.3319 40.7539 0.6586 0.3942 1.1200 -0.0710
29740 Las Cruces NM 0.2830 14.1950 0.7658 0.4945 4.7700 -0.5204
29820 Las Vegas-Paradise NV 2.6143 5.7538 0.9982 0.1449 4.8600 1.4990
29940 Lawrence KS 0.1616 9.0883 0.7461 0.6893 0.3600 -0.9008
30020 Lawton OK 0.1620 1.7247 0.9186 0.4717 2.2900 -1.2620
30140 Lebanon PA 0.1821 21.6701 0.7301 0.6784 -0.6600 -0.7918
30340 Lewiston-Auburn ME 0.1521 6.7201 0.7348 0.6650 -0.3200 -0.9631
30460 Lexington-Fayette KY 0.6366 7.4339 0.8874 0.2408 -2.0342 0.5128
30620 Lima OH 0.1498 6.3170 0.7978 0.4620 -2.3700 -0.9154
30700 Lincoln NE 0.4160 6.3780 0.8194 0.2917 -2.8183 0.2242
30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway AR 0.9487 8.6504 0.8992 0.2235 -0.0673 0.8521
30860 Logan UT-ID 0.1724 17.5016 0.6920 0.6184 2.2845 -0.8079
30980 Longview TX 0.2899 3.1890 0.9405 0.4235 1.0970 -0.5565
31020 Longview WA 0.1430 5.9983 0.8127 0.8130 4.5400 -1.3338
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana CA 18.3301 4.3306 1.2309 0.0708 10.0712 2.8862
31140 Louisville/Jeﬀerson County KY-IN 1.7564 14.2754 0.9145 0.1752 -0.7687 1.5113
31180 Lubbock TX 0.3804 12.8002 0.7377 0.3094 1.7950 -0.0905
31340 Lynchburg VA 0.3468 21.0406 0.7998 0.4312 0.4764 -0.1345
31420 Macon GA 0.3272 31.5646 0.7452 0.3784 0.9051 -0.1751
31460 Madera CA 0.2086 6.7275 0.8891 0.8123 6.0000 -1.0943
31540 Madison WI 0.7910 4.1702 0.9806 0.2343 -0.4945 0.6170
31700 Manchester-Nashua NH 0.5727 0.1167 1.4554 0.5151 0.0700 -0.3611
31900 Mansﬁeld OH 0.1789 33.4517 0.6730 0.4979 -2.8800 -0.5658
32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission TX 1.0115 78.4494 0.6015 0.2479 0.4600 1.0886
32780 Medford OR 0.2837 7.3664 0.7742 0.3762 4.5000 -0.5412
32820 Memphis TN-MS-AR 1.8230 5.5326 0.9880 0.1653 -0.7140 1.4824
32900 Merced CA 0.3495 3.4046 0.9806 0.6661 4.5100 -0.5673
33100 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach FL 7.7064 5.1829 1.0756 0.1063 5.2315 2.4562
33140 Michigan City-La Porte IN 0.1563 21.9162 0.7391 0.6279 -1.8700 -0.8200
33260 Midland TX 0.1800 0.0677 1.2915 0.3498 1.4200 -1.5392
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis WI 2.1987 5.9256 0.9583 0.1410 -1.7072 1.6745
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI 4.5673 4.2763 1.0673 0.1133 -2.1830 2.4717
33540 Missoula MT 0.1504 2.8725 0.8180 0.4512 1.7400 -1.0344
33660 Mobile AL 0.5757 9.1311 0.8016 0.3067 1.5200 0.2423
33700 Modesto CA 0.7278 6.4113 0.9156 0.4128 7.2100 0.0268
33740 Monroe LA 0.2453 9.2380 0.7899 0.4184 0.3390 -0.5074
33780 Monroe MI 0.2187 2.0031 0.9750 0.9408 -1.4300 -0.7490
33860 Montgomery AL 0.5210 12.6484 0.8354 0.3087 0.4625 0.2498
34060 Morgantown WV 0.1677 4.0622 0.9172 0.6007 -0.5645 -0.9222
34100 Morristown TN 0.1916 17.5432 0.7285 0.6252 1.4428 -0.8147
34580 Mount Vernon-Anacortes WA 0.1657 0.7668 1.0340 0.7719 4.9400 -1.4000
34620 Muncie IN 0.1643 21.3999 0.7009 0.5363 -2.6000 -0.6699
34740 Muskegon-Norton Shores MI 0.2483 10.5424 0.7619 0.4962 -0.4000 -0.4569
34820 Myrtle Beach-North Myrtle Beach-Conway SC 0.3558 14.1273 0.7514 0.3492 0.8800 -0.1685
34900 Napa CA 0.1887 0.7977 1.1158 0.6025 7.5300 -1.5827
34940 Naples-Marco Island FL 0.4496 0.8553 1.0987 0.3608 5.0000 -0.4961
34980 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin TN 2.1660 8.8103 0.9775 0.1761 -0.8913 1.6814
35300 New Haven-Milford CT 1.2037 0.3565 1.3393 0.3373 2.5200 0.3149
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner LA 1.4669 0.3827 1.3139 0.1997 0.3337 0.8483
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island NY-NJ-PA 26.7870 2.3289 1.4318 0.0708 0.7740 3.7219
35660 Niles-Benton Harbor MI 0.2272 4.2225 0.8899 0.4910 -0.3000 -0.7112
35980 Norwich-New London CT 0.3806 2.5282 0.9939 0.3834 2.4300 -0.4626
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36100 Ocala FL 0.4625 26.5691 0.7385 0.4508 2.5900 0.0392
36140 Ocean City NJ 0.1373 1.0674 0.9729 0.6085 0.0700 -1.4334
36220 Odessa TX 0.1845 1.7012 0.8694 0.4434 2.5000 -1.1410
36260 Ogden-Clearﬁeld UT 0.7379 7.3733 0.8296 0.3433 4.0883 0.3479
36420 Oklahoma City OK 1.6984 8.9525 0.9256 0.1702 0.1199 1.4212
36500 Olympia WA 0.3396 2.6762 0.8761 0.5266 3.3200 -0.5078
36540 Omaha-Council Bluﬀs NE-IA 1.1815 4.6939 0.9594 0.1726 -1.6836 1.1351
36740 Orlando-Kissimmee FL 2.8935 9.3348 0.9478 0.1484 3.6792 1.6530
36780 Oshkosh-Neenah WI 0.2308 3.4099 0.8448 0.3631 -1.3700 -0.5731
36980 Owensboro KY 0.1596 5.0431 0.8563 0.4904 -0.9396 -0.9497
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura CA 1.1366 1.0892 1.1665 0.3101 11.1700 -0.0195
37340 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville FL 0.7633 7.0268 0.8433 0.3242 3.9300 0.3194
37460 Panama City-Lynn Haven FL 0.2335 3.9684 0.8128 0.4859 2.1500 -0.7925
37620 Parkersburg-Marietta-Vienna WV-OH 0.2287 20.4051 0.7635 0.4824 -0.0229 -0.5302
37700 Pascagoula MS 0.2164 3.3176 0.8870 0.6623 0.1912 -0.7469
37860 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent FL 0.6455 10.5757 0.8059 0.3574 2.0978 0.3456
37900 Peoria IL 0.5285 6.0365 0.9428 0.2890 -2.5036 0.3764
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington PA-NJ-DE-MD 8.2969 5.0519 1.1876 0.1023 -0.6748 2.8345
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ 5.9500 13.0025 0.9713 0.1114 4.3136 2.4388
38220 Pine Bluﬀ AR 0.1445 18.4953 0.7485 0.5508 -1.2731 -0.8725
38300 Pittsburgh PA 3.3537 10.5364 0.9970 0.1425 0.4012 2.0415
38340 Pittsﬁeld MA 0.1848 0.0590 1.5480 0.7997 0.8100 -1.5454
38540 Pocatello ID 0.1247 18.4792 0.6806 0.5365 1.9030 -1.1149
38860 Portland-South Portland-Biddeford ME 0.7305 0.3729 1.2367 0.3868 0.9595 0.1744
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton OR-WA 3.0966 2.5795 1.0900 0.1534 2.8130 1.7475
38940 Port St. Lucie FL 0.5696 4.4925 0.8792 0.4656 5.1827 -0.0890
39100 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown NY 0.9537 57.5790 0.7869 0.3958 0.0107 0.8914
39140 Prescott AZ 0.3027 55.8791 0.7200 0.5665 5.2100 -0.4084
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River RI-MA 2.2790 1.8282 1.1372 0.2242 1.2849 1.3694
39340 Provo-Orem UT 0.7023 15.6423 0.8210 0.3378 3.0296 0.5132
39380 Pueblo CO 0.2200 33.0571 0.6806 0.5804 2.1100 -0.5738
39460 Punta Gorda FL 0.2176 4.7904 0.8279 0.6776 5.1000 -1.0319
39540 Racine WI 0.2777 2.6053 0.9046 0.5556 -0.5100 -0.5717
39580 Raleigh-Cary NC 1.4914 4.1913 0.9997 0.2143 -0.6762 1.1883
39660 Rapid City SD 0.1712 10.5487 0.7744 0.4558 -0.3579 -0.7024
39740 Reading PA 0.5722 12.9659 0.8697 0.3670 -0.7300 0.2974
39820 Redding CA 0.2554 5.9179 0.8368 0.4672 5.6900 -0.7588
39900 Reno-Sparks NV 0.5841 6.1702 0.9153 0.2685 6.7038 -0.0559
40060 Richmond VA 1.7268 11.1761 0.9742 0.1846 -0.9568 1.4730
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA 5.8104 104.4265 0.8632 0.1695 4.3817 2.5456
40220 Roanoke VA 0.4222 22.5390 0.7805 0.3012 0.9380 0.0199
40340 Rochester MN 0.2578 7.1786 0.8243 0.3375 -3.3458 -0.2406
40380 Rochester NY 1.4670 9.7948 0.9057 0.1746 -0.6948 1.3292
40420 Rockford IL 0.5015 16.7848 0.7779 0.3553 -2.7901 0.3797
40580 Rocky Mount NC 0.2073 6.0239 0.8554 0.4688 -1.7475 -0.6464
40660 Rome GA 0.1361 17.3345 0.7232 0.6475 0.3300 -1.0785
40900 Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville CA 2.9770 4.8303 1.0444 0.1708 5.4091 1.5526
40980 Saginaw-Saginaw Township North MI 0.2880 16.5948 0.7583 0.3910 -3.3300 -0.0839
41060 St. Cloud MN 0.2642 12.5971 0.7626 0.4347 -3.0004 -0.1386
41100 St. George UT 0.1905 23.2639 0.6948 0.4957 2.5700 -0.7385
41140 St. Joseph MO-KS 0.1756 10.6024 0.7922 0.5409 -1.4641 -0.7059
41180 St. Louis MO-IL 3.9914 19.9079 0.9226 0.1312 -0.4277 2.3707
41420 Salem OR 0.5505 9.5532 0.8053 0.3850 3.4215 0.1330
41500 Salinas CA 0.5803 1.2221 1.1497 0.3426 9.2400 -0.5045
41540 Salisbury MD 0.1703 13.6356 0.7665 0.6063 -0.3934 -0.8133
41620 Salt Lake City UT 1.5660 5.5353 0.9849 0.1645 3.3545 1.1401
41660 San Angelo TX 0.1539 11.3999 0.7550 0.5001 1.5945 -0.9984
41700 San Antonio TX 2.8340 12.2914 0.9238 0.1656 2.1287 1.8188
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos CA 4.2351 1.5943 1.2222 0.1332 9.7800 1.4266
41780 Sandusky OH 0.1101 4.8876 0.7919 0.5651 -0.9100 -1.3725
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont CA 5.9848 0.3531 1.4952 0.1203 7.3604 1.6192
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA 2.5677 0.1447 1.5878 0.1526 5.5612 0.8121
42020 San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles CA 0.3736 2.4081 1.0086 0.3809 7.8700 -0.6538
42060 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta CA 0.5754 0.8643 1.1438 0.2810 10.9700 -0.5659
42100 Santa Cruz-Watsonville CA 0.3584 0.6286 1.1396 0.6419 8.4900 -1.0716
42140 Santa Fe NM 0.2035 0.1706 1.2396 0.6477 3.0200 -1.2264
42220 Santa Rosa-Petaluma CA 0.6612 1.8173 1.0370 0.3670 7.9300 -0.2054
42260 Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice FL 0.9783 8.0869 0.8481 0.2326 4.7123 0.5228
42340 Savannah GA 0.4688 9.2001 0.8077 0.3385 0.7595 0.0822
42540 Scranton–Wilkes-Barre PA 0.7822 62.6807 0.7348 0.2540 0.3497 0.7451
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue WA 4.7113 1.1719 1.2432 0.1332 4.6088 1.8885
42680 Sebastian-Vero Beach FL 0.1877 1.2555 0.9359 0.6381 4.7200 -1.2862
43100 Sheboygan WI 0.1630 3.2650 0.8625 0.4794 -0.3700 -1.0073
43300 Sherman-Denison TX 0.1689 20.5729 0.7343 0.7441 0.7800 -0.9061
43340 Shreveport-Bossier City LA 0.5518 0.5061 1.2082 0.2672 0.4263 -0.0654
43580 Sioux City IA-NE-SD 0.2033 6.7056 0.8078 0.3518 -1.6477 -0.5531
43620 Sioux Falls SD 0.3234 0.9176 1.0383 0.3194 -3.1981 -0.1810
48Table 1: msa variables and descriptives for the initial equilibrium
fips msa name State Lr/L b µmax
r 1/mr b θr Ao
r b Au
r
43780 South Bend-Mishawaka IN-MI 0.4508 5.9962 0.9017 0.3487 -2.3182 0.1576
43900 Spartanburg SC 0.3923 11.2840 0.7992 0.3525 0.5200 -0.1066
44060 Spokane WA 0.6494 3.8173 0.8466 0.2893 1.3300 0.3953
44100 Springﬁeld IL 0.2941 14.5944 0.7757 0.3680 -2.6215 -0.1150
44140 Springﬁeld MA 0.9719 48.7269 0.7653 0.2673 -0.0296 0.9868
44180 Springﬁeld MO 0.5980 42.4428 0.7162 0.3118 -0.1019 0.5377
44220 Springﬁeld OH 0.2000 20.6803 0.7124 0.6353 -2.0300 -0.5560
44300 State College PA 0.2059 5.6983 0.8980 0.4912 -0.4000 -0.6733
44700 Stockton CA 0.9552 9.1216 0.8869 0.3999 4.7700 0.4709
44940 Sumter SC 0.1480 5.4151 0.8191 0.6486 0.4500 -1.1196
45060 Syracuse NY 0.9187 11.6878 0.8621 0.2285 -1.0878 0.9094
45220 Tallahassee FL 0.5016 15.0466 0.7887 0.3650 1.8418 0.1910
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL 3.8779 17.9295 0.8662 0.1303 4.0087 1.9781
45460 Terre Haute IN 0.2411 20.4346 0.7766 0.5363 -2.2437 -0.3093
45500 Texarkana TX 0.1911 11.9339 0.7701 0.4806 0.3401 -0.7535
45780 Toledo OH 0.9267 18.0928 0.8282 0.2156 -2.2985 0.9937
45820 Topeka KS 0.3256 22.9574 0.7672 0.3978 -1.2054 -0.0417
45940 Trenton-Ewing NJ 0.5203 1.6191 1.0467 0.3137 -0.8000 -0.1181
46060 Tucson AZ 1.3768 24.1671 0.8204 0.2328 4.0400 1.0965
46140 Tulsa OK 1.2895 5.5205 0.9845 0.1913 0.4138 1.0760
46220 Tuscaloosa AL 0.2922 7.7286 0.8737 0.3964 0.5956 -0.3554
46340 Tyler TX 0.2829 3.5960 0.8892 0.4075 0.7200 -0.5192
46540 Utica-Rome NY 0.4198 76.1905 0.6887 0.3637 -1.6177 0.3300
46660 Valdosta GA 0.1853 33.3007 0.6831 0.4890 0.4906 -0.6906
46700 Vallejo-Fairﬁeld CA 0.5817 2.3184 1.0196 0.5800 5.8800 -0.2641
47020 Victoria TX 0.1620 1.9775 0.9658 0.5431 0.7132 -1.1395
47220 Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton NJ 0.2214 18.9165 0.7773 0.5472 0.3800 -0.6868
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News VA-NC 2.3615 6.6554 0.9682 0.1646 0.7721 1.5923
47300 Visalia-Porterville CA 0.6001 20.2186 0.8264 0.3309 5.6500 0.1024
47380 Waco TX 0.3248 14.4336 0.7623 0.3399 0.7600 -0.2405
47580 Warner Robins GA 0.1865 2.0361 0.8817 0.5774 -0.0400 -0.9647
47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV 7.5546 2.1874 1.2875 0.1175 -0.5658 2.6267
47940 Waterloo-Cedar Falls IA 0.2325 4.0817 0.8784 0.3123 -3.6928 -0.3363
48140 Wausau WI 0.1850 8.5505 0.7840 0.4457 -3.3000 -0.5433
48260 Weirton-Steubenville WV-OH 0.1745 12.5561 0.7784 0.6507 -0.4289 -0.8395
48300 Wenatchee WA 0.1526 2.5064 0.9367 0.6415 1.1223 -1.0532
48540 Wheeling WV-OH 0.2071 27.1680 0.7306 0.5045 -0.0508 -0.6087
48620 Wichita KS 0.8491 7.0330 0.8959 0.2070 -0.5189 0.7748
48660 Wichita Falls TX 0.2109 3.6100 0.9231 0.4866 -0.0733 -0.7295
48700 Williamsport PA 0.1663 37.1189 0.7212 0.5359 0.3300 -0.8261
48900 Wilmington NC 0.4833 4.2397 0.9124 0.3689 0.8620 0.0454
49020 Winchester VA-WV 0.1725 8.0065 0.8765 0.8358 0.2643 -0.9449
49180 Winston-Salem NC 0.6594 3.7013 0.9707 0.2738 -0.3283 0.3418
49340 Worcester MA 1.1124 1.7596 1.1348 0.4121 0.2400 0.7079
49420 Yakima WA 0.3318 3.8343 0.9066 0.4012 1.4800 -0.2958
49620 York-Hanover PA 0.5994 20.5103 0.8111 0.4145 -0.5800 0.3817
49660 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman OH-PA 0.8125 37.2035 0.7640 0.2679 -2.2828 0.9348
49700 Yuba City CA 0.2337 1.2193 1.0373 0.9995 3.3821 -1.0057
49740 Yuma AZ 0.2713 45.4247 0.6962 0.3985 4.2400 -0.5236
Notes: See Sections 4 and 5 for computational details on how to obtain the upper bounds, other amenities, and commuting friction parameters.
49Table 2: Cross-msa distribution of establishment numbers and average size – summary for observed and
simulated data
Mean St.dev. Min Max Correlation
Variable Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model-Observed
# of establishments total 18067.10 18067.09 16878.09 43138.45 1738 911 109210 541255 0.7253
# of establishments size 1-19 15444.74 15461.97 12066.43 37449.79 1550 804 79181 478618 0.3824
# of establishments size 20-99 2121.56 2162.09 6320.64 4728.28 49 93 52178 51310 0.9412
# of establishments size 100-499 429.83 397.50 1729.44 922.34 14 13 24365 9951 0.8890
# of establishments size 500+ 70.94 45.52 132.67 113.75 2 1 1509 1376 0.9320
Avg establishment size 11.73 15.40 11.63 2.60 0.90 6.40 131.88 23.70 0.1716
Notes: Model values are computed from a representative sample of 6,431,886 establishments. The small diﬀerence (of 2 units) with respect the observed
number of establishments in the 2007 County Business Patterns is due to rounding in the sampling procedure. Establishment sizes in the model are
scaled to match the total employment ﬁgure for the 356 msas from the 2007 County Business Patterns. The number of observations is N = 356 msas
in all cases.
Table 3: Shipment shares and shipping distances – summary for observed and simulated data
Employment Number of establishments Shipment shares by distance shipped to destination Mean distance shipped
< 100 miles 100–500 miles > 500 miles
Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Observed Model Model (wgt)
All 6,431,884 6,431,886 0.261 0.506 0.288 0.277 0.348 0.217 529.6 71.98 739.8
1–19 5,504,463 5,498,328 0.561 0.984 0.204 0.016 0.194 0.000 327.2 38.5 61.2
20–99 769,705 755,275 0.382 0.835 0.288 0.162 0.276 0.004 423.8 157.9 194.4
100–499 141,510 153,021 0.254 0.420 0.318 0.440 0.342 0.139 520.4 556.0 740.3
500+ 16,206 25,255 0.203 0.079 0.272 0.332 0.388 0.590 588.6 1450.6 1519.1
Notes: Shipping distance and shipping share columns are adapted from calculations by Holmes and Stevens (2010, Table 1) who use conﬁdential Census
microdata from the 1997 Commodity Flow Survey. The small diﬀerence (of 2 units) between the observed and model total number of establishments
is due to rounding in our sampling procedure. The last column reports distances shipped weighted by establishments’ sales shares in total sales.
Table 4: Summary of the counterfactuals
Baseline counterfactuals (no agglomeration economies)
No urban frictions (cf1) No trade frictions (cf2)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change 1/mr -0.06 0.26 0.04 78.50 14.26 67.59
% change Lr -2.15 3.60 0 4.30 15.28 0
% change Λr -8.79 1.82 -9.85 -43.55 4.27 -39.90
% change Vr 9.69 2.24 10.98 78.17 13.79 67.62
RS coeﬃcient -0.9178 -0.9392
Baseline counterfactuals (short-run, no labor mobility)
No urban frictions (cf1) No trade frictions (cf2)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change 1/mr 0.07 0.20 0.01 77.93 14.15 67.10
% change Lr 0 0 0 0 0 0
% change Λr -8.91 1.67 -9.83 -43.45 4.39 -39.68
% change Vr 9.83 2.05 10.93 77.93 14.15 67.10
RS coeﬃcient -0.9249 -0.9249
Robustness checks (with agglomeration economies)
No urban frictions (cf3) No trade frictions (cf4)
Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean Mean Std. dev. Weighted mean
% change 1/mr -0.12 0.31 0.04 78.71 14.03 67.63
% change Lr -2.21 3.74 0 4.50 16.15 0
% change Λr -8.74 1.89 -9.85 -43.60 4.33 -39.90
% change Vr 9.62 2.33 10.98 78.36 14.03 67.66
RS coeﬃcient -0.9176 -0.9394
Notes: Weighted mean refers to the mean percentage change where the weights are given by the
msas’ initial population shares. The counterfactual scenarios cf3 and cf4 include the agglomeration
economies speciﬁcation developed in Section 6.2. RS coeﬃcient refers to the slope of the estimated
rank-size relationship.
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Figure 2: Distribution of technological possibilities b µmax
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Figure 3: Micro-ﬁt for establishment-level shipments across msas (kernel regressions on distance)
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Figure 4: Rank-size rule, observed and counterfactual (cf1)
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Figure 7: Spatial pattern of counterfactual changes in Lr, 1/md
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Figure 10: Distribution of counterfactual changes in Lr, 1/mr and Λr (cf2)
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Figure 11: Spatial pattern of counterfactual changes in Lr, 1/md
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Figure 12: Diﬀerence in short- and long-run relationships between ∆md
r and Lr (cf1)
60CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1107  Andrea Ariu 
Giordano Mion 
Service Trade and Occupational Tasks: An 
Empirical Investigation 




Do Cash Transfers Improve Birth Outcomes? 
Evidence from Matched Vital Statistics, 
Social Security and Program Data 
1105  Thomas Sampson  Assignment Reversals: Trade, Skill 
Allocation and Wage Inequality 
1104  Brian Bell 
Stephen Machin 
Immigrant Enclaves and Crime 
1103  Swati Dhingra  Trading Away Wide Brands for Cheap 
Brands 
1102  Francesco Caselli 
Antonio Ciccone 
A Note on Schooling in Development 
Accounting 
1101  Alan Manning 
Barbara Petrongolo 
How Local Are Labour Markets? Evidence 
from a Spatial Job Search Model 








Change and Persistence in the German Model 
of Collective Bargaining and Worker 
Representation 
1098  Joan Costa-Font 
Mireia Jofre-Bonet 
Anorexia, Body Image and Peer Effects: 
Evidence from a Sample of European Women 
1097  Michal White 
Alex Bryson 
HRM and Workplace Motivation: 
Incremental and Threshold Effects 
1096  Dominique Goux 
Eric Maurin 
Barbara Petrongolo 
Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor 
Supply 
1095  Petri Böckerman 
Alex Bryson 
Pekka Ilmakunnas 
Does High Involvement Management 
Improve Worker Wellbeing? 
1094  Olivier Marie 
Judit Vall Castello 
Measuring the (Income) Effect of Disability 
Insurance Generosity on Labour Market 
Participation 1093  Claudia Olivetti 
Barbara Petrongolo 
Gender Gaps Across Countries and Skills: 
Supply, Demand and the Industry Structure 
1092  Guy Mayraz  Wishful Thinking 
1091  Francesco Caselli 
Andrea Tesei 
Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and 
Political Stability 
1090  Keyu Jin 
Nan Li 
Factor Proportions and International Business 
Cycles 
1089  Yu-Hsiang Lei 
Guy Michaels 
Do Giant Oilfield Discoveries Fuel Internal 
Armed Conflicts? 
1088  Brian Bell 
John Van Reenen 
Firm Performance and Wages: Evidence from 
Across the Corporate Hierarchy 
1087  Amparo Castelló-Climent 
Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana 
The Role of Educational Quality and Quantity 
in the Process of Economic Development 
1086  Amparo Castelló-Climent 
Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay 
Mass Education or a Minority Well Educated 
Elite in the Process of Development: the Case 
of India 
1085  Holger Breinlich  Heterogeneous Firm-Level Responses to 
Trade Liberalisation: A Test Using Stock 
Price Reactions 
1084  Andrew B. Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
Stephen J. Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
The Empirics of Firm Heterogeneity and 
International Trade 
1083  Elisa Faraglia 
Albert Marcet 
Andrew Scott 
In Search of a Theory of Debt Management 
1082  Holger Breinlich 
Alejandro Cuñat 
A Many-Country Model of Industrialization 
1081  Francesca Cornaglia 
Naomi E. Feldman 
Productivity, Wages and Marriage: The Case 
of Major League Baseball 
1080  Nicholas Oulton  The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: True 
PPPs for 141 Countries 
1079  Gary S. Becker 
Yona Rubinstein 
Fear and the Response to Terrorism: An 
Economic Analysis 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673  Fax 020 7955 7595 
Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk  Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  